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Abstract
A birth  certificate  establishes  a  child's  legal  identity  and  age,  but  few quantitative  estimates  of  the 
significance of birth registration exist. Birth registration laws were enacted by U.S. states in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Using 1910-1930 census data, this study finds that minimum working age legislation 
was twice as effective in reducing under-aged employment if children were born with a birth registration 
law, with positive implications for school attendance. Registration laws also improved the enforcement of 
schooling laws somewhat, but the connection is weaker. The long-term effect of registration laws was to 
increase educational attainment by 0.06-0.1 years.
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1 Introduction
For any law with an age requirement  to fulfill  its  purpose,  credible formal proof of age is  required. 
Whether this exists, depends on whether the birth of the individual was officially registered, and whether 
a certificate exists, or can be requested from an official file.
 In most developed countries today, the registration of births is taken for granted. However, in 
many  developing  countries,  the  births  of  a  significant  proportion  of  children  go  unregistered.  For 
example, according to most recent survey-based estimates, the share of children under five whose births 
were registered was 7 percent in Ethiopia, 41 percent in India, 53 percent in Indonesia and 60 percent in 
Kenya (UNICEF, 2011).1 In the past decade, international organizations have been campaigning to raise 
birth registration rates in developing countries (see e.g. Cody, 2009). A more general recording exercise, 
in the form of biometric identity creation, is currently underway in India.2
A birth certificate establishes a person's legal identity and functions as official proof of age (see 
e.g. Todres, 2003). According to UNICEF (2005), without a birth certificate, children cannot necessarily 
be considered legally under-aged for certain activities, such as marriage, work, or prosecution. Access to 
health  care,  social  security  or  education  may  also  be  denied  without  a  birth  certificate  in  several 
developing countries. Additionally,  the registration of births and other vital  events generates accurate 
figures  on the population and is  therefore also considered important  from a planning perspective,  in 
particular in the context of health care. 
Despite the potentially large-scale significance of birth registration from an economic and welfare 
perspective, the study of birth registration has not attracted attention from economists. The importance of 
identity  documentation  in  general  has  been  recognized  in  relation  to  access  to  formal  finance  in 
developing countries (see e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) and in a recent study, Giné et al. (2011) find 
that the use of fingerprinting as a proof of identity raised repayment rates of microfinance borrowers in 
Malawi. Some general reports on the consequences of lack of birth registration exist (see e.g. ADB, 2007 
and Harbitz and Boekle-Giuffrida, 2009), but there is a general lack of causal statistical evidence on the 
economic, and social significance of birth registration. 
A few  historians  have  discussed  the  significance  of  birth  registration  as  an  important,  but 
neglected  institution  for  economic  development.  Szreter  (2007)  describes  the  importance  of  parish 
registers  in  England  between  the  16th and  18th  centuries  in  the  process  of  verifying  property  and 
inheritance rights as well as social security claims (the Poor Laws). Higgs (1996) describes how the need 
to clarify property rights lies behind the establishment of civil registration systems in Britain in the 19 th 
century.  An  established  economic  literature  on  the  importance  of  property  rights  for  economic 
development  exists  (e.g.  de  Soto,  2000),  but  the  potential  importance  of  the  legal  existence  of  an 
individual in this context has been a more neglected aspect.
1 Based on surveys between 2006-2008.
2 See e.g. The Economist, 14 January 2012
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In order to understand more about the potential economic significance of birth registration, this 
study focuses on early 20th century USA, when state-level laws and institutions for birth registration were 
established across U.S. states.  The purpose of these laws was to ensure that births were registered, a 
central record existed and that certificates of birth were made available. The quantitative analysis exploits 
the fact that the timing of the enactment of state birth registration laws varied across states. At this point  
in time, if births were registered, this happened early in the child’s life.  Delayed registration of births was 
not a standard practice until the early 1940s, when economic necessities led to states adopting standard 
procedures for delayed birth registration (see Hetzel, 1997 and Landrum, 2010a). 
The study focuses on a question for which outcome data are available and  on  which  historical 
documentation exists; the relevance of birth registration for the enforcement of minimum working age 
and compulsory schooling legislation. The incidence of child labor in the U.S. declined significantly in 
the early 20th century.  The  study examines whether  the legal age requirements were more effective in 
reducing under-aged employment and in raising school attendance of school-aged children when birth 
certificates were available as proof of age. These questions remain relevant for today’s developing world.3 
The census data used in this study do not include information on whether the birth of an individual had 
been registered,  so  it  is  assumed that  an  individual  was significantly more  likely to  possess  a  birth 
certificate if they had been born with a birth registration law in place than before such as law.
The  roles  played  by  compulsory  schooling  laws  and  child  labor  laws  in  either  educational 
attainment, or in the incidence of child labor in the U.S., have been studied previously by economists (see 
e.g.  Osterman,  1979,  Brown  et  al.,  1992,  Angrist  and  Krueger,  1991,  Margo  and  Finegan,  1996, 
Moehling, 1999, Lleras-Muney, 2002, Manacorda, 2006, Goldin and Katz, 2008). Econometric studies 
indicate that the laws may have been relevant for raising education levels, or reducing child employment, 
but that their contribution was not large. The economic literature on these laws has so far ignored the role 
of birth registration in legal enforcement.4 
The core part of the analysis in this study utilizes individual-level data from 1 percent samples of 
three U.S. federal censuses; for 1910, 1920 and 1930. Whether a child was born with a registration law in 
place depended on his, or her year of birth and state of birth. The minimum working age and compulsory 
schooling laws varied by state and over time. The  econometric framework used to identify the legal 
effects controls for state of birth, state of residence as well as birth cohort effects. The minimum working 
age legislation and child labor as the outcome are studied in more detail. The data source used does not 
capture regular school attendance well, and it is argued that historical writing includes more discussion on 
the use of birth certificates in the enforcement of minimum working age laws rather than schooling laws. 
3 For example, according to UNICEF (2011), one in six children aged between 5-14 are engaged in child labor.
4 In this connection it should noted that the author is aware of an unpublished study by Puerta (2010) on the effects of child  
labor laws on the value added in the U.S. manufacturing sector, where a robustness check takes into account whether the child  
labor law required documentary proof of age.    
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The  study  finishes  with  a  brief  retrospective  analysis  on  the  implications  of  birth  registration  for 
educational attainment, using the 1960 census and individuals born between 1896-1925. 
The analysis on child labor focuses on the 1910-1930 census data and 12-15 year old children. The 
findings show that the minimum working age legislation reduced the tendency of under-aged children to 
work in relation to the work-eligible, but the law was twice as effective when children had been born 
during, or after the year, when their state of birth had enacted a birth registration law. The result is robust  
to several specifications and a falsification exercise. A further investigation suggests that the effect of the 
registration laws was confined to children residing in counties where agriculture was not the dominant 
economic activity. It is found that those below the minimum working age were also more likely to attend 
school when they had been born with rather than without a birth registration law in place. 
The compulsory schooling age is not found to be a relevant factor for child employment, or school 
attendance for 12-15 years olds, after minimum working age is controlled for. Birth registration laws do 
not alter this conclusion. However, for a sample of younger children (6-11), those within the compulsory 
schooling age range were more likely to attend school than those outside, when they had been born with a 
birth  registration  law.  An  analysis  with  the  1960  census  indicates  that  children  born  with  a  birth 
registration law in place had around 0.06-0.1 more years of education than those born before a birth  
registration law. 
The study confirms that birth registration is an important institution for the enforcement of laws 
that  specify  an  age  requirement.  This  has  implications  for  studies  on  such  laws  both  for  today's  
developing countries, and in a historical context. Although the aim is not to evaluate the effects of a 
particular legal age requirement on household net welfare, at the level of an individual, the results on 
education could be considered indicative of longer term welfare improvements. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the developments in birth registration in the 
USA.  Section  3  discusses  the  relevant  existing  literature  on  the  effectiveness  of  child  labor  and 
compulsory schooling laws in the U.S. context and Section 4 discusses the hypotheses on the relevance of 
birth registration laws. Sections 5 and 6 describe the data and econometric analysis with respect to child 
labor and schooling respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Birth registration in the U.S.
The roots of modern birth registration systems in the USA are reported to lie in the need for 
accurate statistics on births and deaths in the face of rapid urbanization in the 19 th century, spread of 
epidemics and associated mortality. Proponents of sanitary reform advocated for accurate statistics on the 
incidence  of  births  and  deaths  to  further  their  cause  (see  Hetzel,  1997).  The  development  of  birth 
registration systems in the early 20th century could also be regarded as an element of Progressive-era child 
welfare reforms (Landrum, 2011).
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Shapiro  (1950)  describes  Massachusetts  as  the  first  state  to  pass  a  “modern”  state-level  law 
requiring that births and deaths are registered. The law was passed in 1841 and strengthened in 1844 to  
include full details on associated fees and penalties for late registration. Uniform birth certificates were to 
be issued throughout the state, a state-wide file of copies of the records was created and attention was 
paid to enforcement of the legislation.5 
According to Hetzel (1997, p. 48), “between 1850 and 1860, registration was working well in a 
handful of cities and in two States.” The American Public Health Association, founded in 1872 played an 
advocacy role  and the Census Office (Bureau of the Census),  became the primary body involved in 
developing a system  for the  collection of  annual  vital statistics data, aiming  at nationally  comparable 
statistics. The process by which states enacted laws making birth registration mandatory at the  level of 
states was a gradual one. Hetzel (1997, p. 53) cites a National Resources Committee report as follows: “in 
some States, the boards of health had to be educated to the need, before the citizens of that State could 
approach the legislature. In others, the legislatures were apathetic, in spite of strong pressures...” 
Significant  progress  in  the  enactment  of  state-level  registration  laws,  and birth  registration  is 
considered to have been made after a model registration bill was passed in 1907. According to Shapiro 
(1950, p. 91), this Model Vital Statistics Act specified the “central authority of the State boards of health 
over registration matters, provided for the establishment of a strong local apparatus, fixed responsibility 
for registering births on the attendant at birth (physician, midwife)6, called for rigid enforcement of the 
law, and listed a minimum set of items for inclusion on State certificates”.7 Pennsylvania adopted a draft 
version of this bill in 1905 (came into force in 1906) and according to Shapiro (1950), the improvements 
in birth registration were “immediate”. Many other states followed suit,  or amended existing laws to 
conform to the Model Act (Shapiro, 1950). The discussion in Hetzel (1997) and Shapiro (1950) suggests 
that the core aims of state registration laws were to enable birth registration and make it  mandatory, 
standardize registration practices and provide uniform birth certificates and as well as establish central 
repositories of birth certificates, which would facilitate their use. 
Enforcement of these state-level registration laws was not perfect to begin with. In some cases, 
early state laws did not include penalties and were therefore potentially less effective in registering the 
population (see Nichols, 1980). The National Birth Registration area was established in 1915. Ten states 
(in north-eastern and north central parts) and the District of Columbia were included (Shapiro, 1950). The 
criteria for the initial inclusion are somewhat unclear, but from thereafter states were included when 90 
percent  of  births  were estimated to  be  registered (Shapiro,  1950).  From 1915 onwards,  annual  birth 
statistics were gathered for the expanding birth registration area (see Hetzel, 1997). Through time, the 
5  Landrum (2011) explains that by 1861 in Massachusetts,  town clerks were incentivized by payments for each birth they 
reported to the state and fined for not registering births. Parents could be fined up to 5 dollars for not reporting a birth. 
6 According to Landrum (2011), the model law specified that doctors and midwives were not allowed to collect a fee for filing 
a certificate with the local registrar. They faced penalties for not undertaking this duty.
7  See Hetzel (1997), p. 28 for a table on the content of a U.S. standard birth certificate across time since 1900.
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registration of births and deaths became a regular health department function. 
Prior to early 1940s, regulation, or procedures for delayed birth registration were either missing, 
or  slow  and  complex,  which  strongly  inhibited  late  registration  (see  Hetzel,  1997).8 According  to 
estimates, in 1940 the births of nearly 55 million Americans9 had never been registered (Hetzel, 1997). 
Only in 1941 did the Census Bureau design a manual on procedures for delayed registration, which were 
then adopted by a large number of states (Hetzel, 1997). The absence of functioning delayed registration 
implies that if a child was not registered at birth, or shortly after, there was a high likelihood that their 
birth remained unregistered, until the early 1940s.10 Differences in registration rates remained with respect 
to race and urban versus rural location for some time. Estimates in 1940 showed that while 94 percent of 
white births were estimated to be registered, the corresponding figure was 81.5 percent for black births. 
There was also an urban-rural differential of 9.5 percent in favor of urban, likely to be driven by the lower 
rates of hospital births in rural areas (see Shapiro, 1950).
States may have had some practices for recording births prior to the state birth registration laws 
that  made registration mandatory,  and provided for  certificates  of  birth.  Registration  may have  been 
carried out at the level of counties, or in certain cities, but the coverage was generally weak (see Nichols,  
1980 and Eichholz, 2004).11 In a discussion on early attempts of registration in the 17 th and 18th centuries, 
Hetzel (1997, p. 45) notes that “although a few cities and towns maintained active registration, for many 
years not a single State could be said to have a system covering its entire area”. 
Table 1 shows the year in which the laws that established mandatory birth registration at the state-
level were passed and the year in which the state was incorporated into the National Birth Registration 
area.12 Figure 1 presents a histogram of the timing of the birth registration laws. The data sources and the 
determination of the timing of the laws are discussed in detail in Appendix 1, which also includes a map 
of the timing. Appendix 1 also discusses the correspondence between the years in Table 1 and the year 
from which onwards the State Office of Vital Statistics currently holds records of births (Table A1). 
8  See Landrum (2010a) for a discussion on how the requirement of the war industry to employ U.S. citizens led to a dramatic  
increase in the demand for delayed birth certificates by adults in early 1940s.
9  The total US population in 1940, including foreign born individuals, was 132,164,569. Source: 1990 Census of Population 
and Housing, "1990 Population and Housing Unit Counts: United States", (CPH-2).
10  As an example of the complexities of delayed registration, Landrum (2010a) describes the case of California,  where  
delayed registration was only possible through a complicated court proceeding with fees high enough to discourage most 
ordinary workers.  As an indication of the lack of birth certificates and thus a functioning delayed registration system prior to 
the 1940s, Landrum refers for instance to the case Illinois, where over half a million applications for delayed certificates were 
processed between 1941-1943. Even if some children might have received delayed birth certificates prior to the 1940s, these  
would have been based on alternative proof of age, or parental testimonials, and were thus potentially unreliable. 
11 Any existing records may also have been destroyed by the time a state law came into place, making it impossible to obtain
copies (see e.g. Clopper, 1918 for the case of Alabama). 
12 Analysis excludes Alaska, District of Columbia and Hawaii. Alaska and Hawaii were not states at the time and District of
Columbia is excluded due to its special nature. 
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Table 1 Timing of the state laws on birth registration across U.S. states
Source: Dates for birth registration laws are from Nichols (1980). See Appendix 1 for discussion. Dates for the 
incorporation into the national birth registration area come from Hetzel (1997, Table 1.01, Appendix 2).   
* Information comes from a section of Eichholz (2004) that discusses state vital records.
  Figure 1 Histogram: Timing of the enactment of state birth registration laws across U.S. states.
In 75 percent of the states, the law was passed after 1900. The years in Table 1 indicate that it took 
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 Year of birth Part of birth Year of birth Part of birth
State  registration law registration area State  registration law registration area
Alabama 1908        1927 Nebraska 1904        1920
Arizona 1909        1926 Nevada 1911        1929
Arkansas 1914        1927 New Hampshire 1883        1915
California 1905        1919 New Jersey 1878        1921
Colorado 1907        1928 New Mexico 1920        1929
Connecticut 1897        1915 New York 1880        1915
Delaware 1881        1921 North Carolina 1914        1917
Florida 1899        1924 North Dakota 1907        1924
Georgia 1919        1928 Ohio 1909        1917
Idaho 1911        1926 Oklahoma 1917        1928
Illinois 1916        1922 Oregon 1903        1919
Indiana 1908        1917 Pennsylvania 1906        1915
Iowa 1880        1924 Rhode Island 1896        1915
Kansas 1911        1917 South Carolina 1915        1919
Kentucky 1911        1917 South Dakota 1905        1932
Louisiana 1918        1927 Tennessee 1914        1927
Maine 1892        1915 Texas 1903        1933
Maryland 1898        1916 Utah 1905        1917
Massachusetts 1841        1915 Vermont *1857        1915
Michigan 1906        1915 Virginia 1912        1917
Minnesota 1908        1915 Washington 1907        1917
Mississippi 1912        1921 West Virginia 1925        1925
Missouri 1910        1927 Wisconsin 1908        1917
Montana 1907        1922 Wyoming 1909        1922
longer for some states than others to reach close to full registration coverage since the enactment of the 
law. Nevertheless,  as the discussion above implies,  the state laws on registration can be regarded as 
instrumental for advancing birth registration, and eventually achieving close to full coverage. Therefore, 
this study assumes that birth registration could function effectively, and provide individuals with accurate 
birth certificates on a large-scale, only once state-level laws on compulsory registration were enacted and 
state-level procedures established. The determinants of the timing of the laws could also be analyzed 
empirically, and the results of a state-level regression analysis are discussed in Appendix 2 and will be 
referred to further below.
3 Compulsory schooling laws and child labor laws in the U.S. 
Connection between laws, child labor and schooling
Economists  have tended to analyze  child  labor  in  the context  of family welfare optimization, 
considering returns from child work as opposed to adult work, or returns from schooling as opposed to 
work (see e.g. Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005 and Edmonds, 2008 for detailed surveys). Most of the existing 
empirical research on the effects of child labor laws has focused on the USA, where in the late 19 th and 
early 20th centuries, these laws varied across U.S. states.13 Compulsory schooling laws have been used 
more broadly to study, not just the direct effect on schooling, but the economic and social effects of 
additional education in different contexts (see e.g. Card, 2001 and Lochner, 2011). 
Given the breadth of the literature on child labor and compulsory schooling in general, only key 
empirical research on the effects of child labor laws and compulsory schooling law on education and child 
employment in the context of the USA, is discussed here. As decisions to work and attend school are 
closely connected, so are the two types of laws.
Starting with  a  few studies  on compulsory schooling laws,  an  influential  one by Angrist  and 
Krueger (1991) demonstrates how due to compulsory education laws, the quarter of an individual’s birth 
affects educational attainment and school enrollment for children born between 1930s and 1960s. The 
authors then use the quarter of birth as an instrumental variable for education to study the income effects  
of education.  Margo and Finegan (1996) introduced child labor laws as an additional component to the 
study of the effects of compulsory schooling laws on school enrollment. They rely on a sample of the 
1900 U.S. population census and find that compulsory schooling laws were more effective in six states 
that combined them with a law on minimum working age. 
Earlier research on child labor suggested that factors such as technological change, immigration, 
demography and wealth explained the decline in child labor in late 19 th and early 20th centuries (see e.g. 
Osterman, 1979, Goldin, 1979 and Brown et al., 1992).  Moehling (1999) then  studied the effect of the 
13  The Fair Labor Standards Act, a federal child labor law, was only enacted in 1938 (see e.g. Moehling, 1999). 
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minimum age limit for manufacturing employment between 1880-1910 using a difference in differences 
estimation framework. She concludes that the minimum working age limit did not reduce the likelihood 
of child employment in manufacturing, or any occupation, between 1880 and 1900. It may have been 
somewhat more effective between 1900 and 1910. She shows that significant progress was made in the 
enactment of child labor legislation only in the first decade of the 20th century. 
Lleras-Muney (2002) extends the analysis in earlier studies by considering a range of indicators 
for child labor and schooling laws, including not just the age requirements, but also legal requirements on  
the minimum years of schooling to be completed and the presence of continuation laws. She focuses on  
laws in place between 1915-1939. With the use of a sample of the 1960 U.S. census, she finds that one 
additional required year of schooling raised educational attainment by about 0.05 years. However, the 
impact was confined to whites and depended on the legal indicator used.14
Manacorda (2006) finds that there is a connection between child labor laws and child employment 
using  a  sample  of  the  1920  U.S.  census.  His  study  investigates  primarily  the  impact  of  a  child's 
employment on the labor supply of parents and siblings, but relies on a child labor law indicator to 
construct an instrumental variable for child labor. Simple OLS estimates show that in 1920 for 10-16 year 
old children, minimum working age laws reduced child labor by approximately 5.5 percentage points. 
Goldin and Katz (2008) use state-level data for 1910-1938 to analyze the impact of child labor 
laws and schooling laws on secondary school enrollment. Additionally, they study educational attainment 
with 1960 census data. They focus on requirements on the length of schooling, either for employment, or  
school drop-out, and the presence of continuation schooling laws. They find that together these laws did 
affect enrollment and attainment, but explain at most around 6-7 percent of the increase in either. The 
effect does depend to an extent on the model specification, and specific laws examined. 
To conclude, the key empirical studies suggest that if child labor laws and compulsory schooling 
laws did have an effect  on education,  or child labor,  these effects  were not large.  The literature has 
assumed that once a rigorous modeling strategy is adopted, the impact of child labor laws and compulsory 
schooling  laws  can  be  identified.  This  study  relies  on  the  same  assumption.  Lleras-Muney  (2002) 
investigates the economic correlates of child labor and schooling law indicators at the state  and cohort 
level.  She finds  a  weak relationship  between education levels  and child labor  laws,  but  in  a  further 
investigation on the timing of the laws, concludes that endogeneity is not a significant concern.
Child labor and compulsory schooling laws
The data used in this study on the schooling and child labor laws come from Goldin and Katz 
(2008). These data involve contributions from Schmidt (1996) and Lleras-Muney (2002) and have  been 
used for instance in the study by Manacorda (2006). The source includes annual data on child labor and 
14 An earlier unpublished dissertation by Schmidt (1996), analysing compulsory schooling laws over a similar period, also
finds effects on high school graduation rates.
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compulsory schooling laws between 1910-1939 for each U.S. State.15 In the data source, the values for 
each  state  represent  those  that  applied  to  the  majority  of  the  population,  as  sometimes  there  were 
exemptions or differences between areas within a state. The source includes the minimum working age, or 
schooling requirement for each state and each year, but if a law was already in force, the starting date 
cannot be inferred.
Goldin and Katz (2008) provide a detailed discussion on the child labor and schooling laws and 
their evolution in the early 20th century U.S. The first compulsory schooling laws were enacted in the U.S. 
in the mid-nineteenth century. However,  investments in education  and enforcement, in particular at the 
secondary level,  were  still  made made in  the early 20th century.  This  involved for  instance  defining 
standards for high school education,  increases in expenditure,  especially in poorer districts  and more 
active involvement of truant officers (see e.g. Osterman, 1979, Lleras-Muney, 2002 and Goldin and Katz, 
2008 for details). School censuses were carried out already in the early 20th century to record children 
who should be attending school and by 1928 this took place in each state (Goldin and Katz, 2008).  By 
1907, in a significant number of states, parents faced fines, or imprisonment for failing to send a child to 
school (Goldmark, 1907) .
In states with minimum working age laws, children required “working papers”, or a work permit, 
to be able to work and employers were responsible for holding these papers16 (see Goldin and Katz, 
2008). Mechanisms to enforce child labor laws were also strengthened in the early 20th century. According 
to  Ogburn  (1912) (cited  by Moehling,  1999),  by 1909,  34 states  had  enacted  provisions  for  special 
inspectors to enforce child labor laws.17 Goldmark (1907) suggests that in 1907, an even larger number of 
states had penalties in place for employers for the employment of under-aged children, and a significant 
number of states also had penalties for parents for allowing their children to work, generally in the form 
of fines or imprisonment. There were also penalties for obstructing the entry of factory inspectors.
Several  of  the  studies  discussed  above have  tended  to  focus  on  children  in  non-agricultural 
households as one might expect minimum working age legislation in particular to be less effective, or less 
well enforced, in rural areas, where a large share of children worked in agriculture, and on family farms. 
The relevance for agriculture is thus debatable, but can vary by state. Some states had exemptions for 
hardship, especially in the South (see Hindman, 2009, p. 483), or for children working in establishments 
owned by their parents (see e.g. Riney-Kehrberg, 2001, p. 59). As one concrete example, Riney-Kehrberg 
(2001, p. 58-59) notes that around 1920 in Illinois, under 14-year olds were prohibited from “any gainful 
occupation in, or in connection, with factories, canneries, stores, etc., at any time, or in any work for  
compensation during the school term.” According to Goldmark (1907), in 1907 there were several states 
15 Data on compulsory schooling age requirements are available from 1900.
16 According to Goldmark (1907), at the time of publication the authority that issued “working papers” varied by state. She 
lists school officials, health officers, factory inspectors or judges as the options. 
17 Goldmark (1907) also notes in many states, both truant officers and factory inspectors were authorized to “enter places of 
employment, to demand certificates of age or schooling...”.
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where anyone below 14 years of age was prohibited from all employment during school hours. 
For the child labor law, the core variable of interest is “the minimum legal age for obtaining a 
work permit for work during normal school hours” in the child's state of residence, which is available for 
1910-1939. For compulsory schooling laws, the main indicators used relate to the legal school entry age 
and school leaving age in the child's state of residence (or birth), which are available for 1900-1939. 
Appendix 1 discusses the definitions of the indicators on child labor and schooling laws in more detail. 
Often, the minimum school leaving age was higher than the minimum working age. States tended 
to waive the general requirements on compulsory schooling for working children who had reached the 
minimum working age; in some cases for a minimum educational requirement, in some for the ability to 
read, or write and in others, there were no such length of schooling requirements. As Goldin and Katz 
(2008) state, the binding constraint for work for much of the 1910-1939 period, was the age at which a 
youth could obtain a work permit, or the schooling requirement for employment if such was specified. In 
addition, many states exempted also non-working children from a maximum schooling age requirement if  
they had met a certain amount of schooling (in years). Although previous studies (such as Lleras-Muney, 
2002 and Goldin and Katz, 2008) have exploited legal requirements on the years of schooling, with the 
exception of a robustness check, this study relies on the age requirements. The explanation for this is that  
only age requirements can be considered strictly relevant for studying the role of birth registration in the 
verification of age.18
Table 2 Minimum working age and compulsory schooling age 
across 48 states between 1910-1930, number of states.
        Data source: Goldin and Katz (2008)
Table 2 shows the developments in the child labor and schooling age requirements for 1910, 1920 
and 1930, corresponding to the census years used in the majority of the analysis. Across the years, the 
most common minimum working age was 14. In 1910, 8 states did not have a minimum working age law. 
In 1920, only 2 did not have one and by 1930 all states had such a law. Over the period, the school 
leaving age ranged between 12-18, with 14 being the most common age in 1910 and 16 the most common 
18 The presence of continuation schooling laws, also analyzed in Lleras-Muney (2002) and Goldin and Katz (2008),  are 
controlled for in the retrospective analysis on educational attainment in Section 6. They applied to working children below  
legal school leaving age and thus depend on employment.
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Age Minimum  working age School leaving age Age School entry age
1910 1920 1930 1910 1920 1930 1910 1920 1930
No age 8 2 7 No age 7
12 7 4 2 1 6 2
13 1 7 16 21 29
14 33 36 41 18 8 5 8 24 26 17
15 4 5 4 4 1 9 1 1
16 1 2 15 32 31
17 1 2 6
18 1 1 5
age in 1920 and 1930. The school entry age ranged between 6-9, with 7 and 8 being the most common 
ages. In 1910, 7 states did not have a compulsory school leaving or entry age, but by 1920 all had one. 
The length of schooling requirements are not shown in the Table, but in 1910, the data on the schooling 
requirements for work were missing for 8 states, 18 states only required children to be able to read and 
write and 19 had no minimum education requirements. Such requirements became more common in 1920 
and 1930, ranging between 4-8 years of schooling.
Finally, it could be asked whether the introduction of the minimum working age and compulsory 
schooling age legislation coincided closely with the enactment of birth registration laws? In a sample of 
state-level annual data for 48 states between 1910-1930, the correlation between whether the state had a  
birth registration law and a legal minimum working age was 0.22. For the same period, the correlation 
between whether the state had a legal school leaving age and a birth registration law was 0.34. In 1900, 
32 states had a maximum legal schooling age, but only 12 had enacted a birth registration law. In 1910, 
there were 32 states out of 48 that had enacted a birth registration law, 40 states with a minimum working 
age law and 41 states with a legal school leaving age. The correlation between the enactment of a child 
labor and a compulsory schooling law and a birth registration law is not very strong. Laws on child labor 
and schooling were often introduced prior to a birth registration law. As discussed below, the latter may 
have been a reaction to the difficulties of enforcing child protection laws without formal records of birth.
4 Birth registration and age requirements: hypotheses
According to Shapiro (1950, p. 92), especially post World War I, “the birth record in some places 
became the  primary document  for  verifying  age  in  entering  school  and in  obtaining  work permits”. 
Discussion on the use of birth certificates in the enforcement of minimum working age legislation in the 
early 20th century can be found in historical writings. Birth registration could also affect schooling for 
several reasons, but information on the precise use of birth certificates in the enforcement of compulsory 
schooling age is not as easily available, in particular regarding the school entry process. Schooling laws 
and  child  labor  laws  were  connected,  but  proof  of  age  would  not  directly  serve  a  purpose  in  the 
verification of years of schooling requirements, but only the age requirements. Given that the data source 
used  does  not  capture  regular  school  attendance  well,  the  empirical  analysis  focuses  more  on  the 
minimum working age legislation and child labor as the outcome of interest. This Section discusses the 
documentation and hypotheses on the relevance of birth registration separately for the minimum working 
age and compulsory schooling age laws.
Minimum working age and birth registration
The enforcement of minimum working age legislation took place through the issuance of work 
permits and inspections of work premises. In  1907,  according  to  Goldmark, 17  states  required 
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documentary proof of age for issuing a work permit, or employment certificate, 17 states required no 
proof of age and 14 accepted an affidavit by a parent regarding the age. When documentary evidence was 
required, birth certificates often had priority, but if a birth certificate was unavailable, a baptismal record, 
or a school (graduation) certificate, was generally demanded. That failing, a physical examination may 
have been carried out to establish physical fitness. In general, in 1907 proof of age was required to prove 
age within a certain range (often 14-16, or below 16).  
Practical examples of the relevance of birth certificates in the process of granting work permits 
can be found in historical writings. In New York state, birth certificates were used in early 20 th century as 
the primary proof of age for the purpose of granting work permits (Minor, 1910). In 1909, 75 percent of 
the 30,000 employment certificates in New York City were based on birth certificates as the proof of age. 
If a birth certificate could not be presented, the applicant was formally asked to convince the officers that 
the birth had not been recorded. In Wisconsin, already in 1903, laws listed birth certificates as the primary 
form of proof of age required for obtaining a work permit (McLogan, 1935). Lindenmeyer (1997, p. 120-
121) describes how the lack of birth certificates was identified by the Children's Bureau as an obstacle to 
the  enforcement  of  the  unsuccessful  federal  child  labor  law  between  1916-1918.19 Clopper  (1918) 
describes similar problems in Alabama. The relevance of birth certificates as proof of age in the early 20th 
century U.S. has also recently been noted by Landrum (2009, 2011).
These  examples  suggest  that  for  child  labor  laws  requiring  documentary  proof  of  age  to  be 
effective, birth registration should be functioning at the state-level and copies of certificates should be 
accessible,  preferably  in  a  uniform  format.  This  was  unlikely  without  state  laws  on  compulsory 
registration and  can explain why states did not require documentary proof of age if there was no state 
registration law. Out of the states that Goldmark (1907) lists as requiring documentary proof of age for 
working papers, 71 percent had passed a state-level birth registration law by 1907. Out of the remainder  
that required no proof, or accepted a parent's affidavit, only 37 percent had passed such a law by 1907.
What is the expected effect of birth registration on the enforcement of minimum working age 
legislation? Working children could follow the official route and present an employer with an official 
work permit.  When this  happens,  the responsibility of verifying the age is  placed upon the officials  
granting permits. Alternatively, the employer may be willing to employ children without a permit, but 
risks  punishment,  especially if  factory inspectors  are  able  to  demand convincing proof  of  age  (birth 
certificates). Official proof of age might be expected to prove most useful in borderline situations, such as 
for 12-13 year olds when the minimum working age was 14, rather than for younger children (such as 8-
19 This refers to the  Keyting-Owen Act, which was an attempt at a federal child labor law made in September 1916. It was  
declared unconstitutional shortly after (June 1918), and was in practice effective for less than a year (see e.g. Lindenmeyer,  
1997, p. 91 and p. 121).  Lindenmeyer mentions five states as examples of those where very few children seeking work permits  
had birth certificates around 1916 (North Carolina: 0.2 percent, South Carolina: 0.3 percent, Georgia: 1.4 percent, Mississippi:  
1.8 percent and Virginia: 6 percent). These states enacted state birth registration laws between 1912-1918, but children nearing 
working age had been born before this period.
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10 year olds), for whom under-aged status is less disputable. 
If in a specific state, children hoping to work had been born with a birth registration law in place, 
those seeking a work permit could be expected to present a birth certificate as proof of age. Claims that a  
birth  was  not  registered  could  be  verified  in  the  presence  of  central  records  and  a  repository  of 
certificates. If birth certificates could generally be demanded as proof of age, officials could deny work 
permits from the under-aged. Employers willing to hire without a permit might not be willing to hire 
under-aged children in the knowledge that inspectors would be in a position to demand birth certificates.
If birth certificates did not exist, either in the state as a whole, or for the particular individual,  
alternative proof of age (such as affidavits and other documents with potential for falsification) would be 
relied upon, or the state might not require proof of age. In both cases, children visibly below the working 
age might be denied work. However, those closer to the working age, but still below, might be allowed to 
work, if they presented false proof of age, or were physically mistaken as work-eligible. Therefore, the 
general hypothesis is that under-aged children, in particular those in the borderline category, would be 
less likely to work if they had been born with a birth registration law in place than without such a law. 
How about work-eligible children? If children had reached minimum working age, they would 
either be able to prove with a birth certificate that they are eligible, or in the absence of having had their  
births registered, would generally fall in the borderline category and be likely to be granted permits. If  
only birth  certificates  are  accepted as  proof  of  age,  which  is  a  strict  enforcement  environment,  it  is 
possible that some work-eligible children would be denied a work permit, or work by employers, if they 
could not produce a birth certificate. However, even in the strictest environment, if work-eligible children 
could prove that their birth was not registered, alternative proof may have been accepted. As mentioned 
above,  proof  of  age was required generally up to a  certain age.  Thus,  if  the child  appeared to  have 
physically reached such an age, birth certificates might cease to be relevant.  
Therefore, in conclusion, birth registration could be expected to reduce under-aged employment, 
but not necessarily directly affect the employment of work-eligible children, or do so to a considerably 
smaller degree. In the latter case, assuming that a lack of birth certificates did pose an impediment for 
work, the expected effect of birth registration would be to increase the employment of the work-eligible. 
Compulsory schooling age and birth registration
In  relation  to  compulsory  schooling  laws,  reliable  proof  of  age  should  identify  school-aged 
children  more  accurately,  both  at  the  school  entry  stage,  but  also  later  in  the  detection  of  truants. 
According to Hindman (2009, p. 51), history suggests that in general it  was easier to enforce school 
attendance laws with  “good data, including school registers and birth registration”. In their study on the 
connection between secondary schooling and child labor and compulsory schooling laws, Goldin and 
Katz (2008) note that “changes in enforcement, not changes in the laws, may have mattered, and we (as 
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well as the others mentioned) have not yet secured a variable that  captures enforcement expenditures and 
efforts  for  all  states  during  the  period  of  interest.”  Birth  registration  could  be  considered  a  relevant 
enforcement dimension.
As mentioned above, birth certificates would not be directly relevant for the verification of years 
of  schooling  requirements,  but  only age  requirements,  so  the  discussion  only concerns  the  latter.  If 
schools could demand birth certificates to ascertain a child's age at the school entry stage, children would 
be more likely to enter school at the required age. Those below the schooling age would not be accepted. 
Those having reached this age might be less likely to ignore the law, if they would be expected to present 
official proof of age. Closer to school leaving age, truancy officers and schools could be expected to 
better identify under-aged truants with, rather than without, birth certificates. If school censuses were 
supported by birth certificates, they would also more accurately list school-aged children. In principle, if 
school  censuses  aided  educational  planning,  school-aged  children  would  have  been  identified  more 
accurately,  and  as  a  consequence  birth  registration  may  even  have  had  implications  for  school 
investments. If this were the case, we might see a connection between birth registration and schooling, 
independent of compulsory schooling and child labor laws. 
In general, attendance rates could be expected to be higher for school-aged children born with than 
without  birth  registration  laws.  It  might  also be possible  that  due to  the  lack of  a  birth  certificates, 
children entered school too early, or were not allowed to leave once they had reached the legal leaving 
age. The latter appears less realistic, but if this were the case, children outside the compulsory schooling 
age range would be less likely to be in school when born with than without a birth registration law, when 
other factors contributing to schooling decisions would be controlled for.
5 Birth registration laws and child labor
Data
 The  individual-level  data  in this section come from publicly available 1 percent samples of the 
U.S.  population  censuses  for  1910,  1920  and  1930  in the  Integrated  Public  Use  Microdata  Series 
(IPUMS-USA, Ruggles et al. 2010).20 The variables used in the analysis can be considered more or less 
comparable between the censuses. Potential differences in relation to the dependent variable are discussed 
further below.
The choice of the census  samples  for these particular  years depends on a  number of  factors. 
Methodological justifications for using all the three censuses are discussed below. The census of 1910 is 
the first census to be used, as data on child labor laws is available in the source used from 1910 onwards. 
While some states had enacted birth registration laws before 1900, the difference between the share of  
children of 6-18 years of age born with a registration law in place changed rather little between 1900 and 
20 The samples for these years are unweighted.
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1910 (from an average of 0.16 to 0.20), but increased significantly between 1910 and 1930. Therefore it is 
of interest to carry out the analysis with more than one census. As will be seen in figures below, the share 
of children who reported an occupation also declined significantly between 1910 and 1930, in particular 
between 1910 and 1920.  By 1940,  the share  of  children  who were  employed was small and all  the 
children in the age group studied would have been born with a birth registration law in place.21 
The census does not include information on whether the birth of a child had been registered and 
neither do other available sources of individual-level data. The data on age at the time of the census and 
state of birth are used to define whether a child was born with a birth registration law in place. In most  
cases the month of the enactment of the law is not available in the data source used. The censuses for  
1910-1930 do not include information on the year, or month of birth, and therefore the year of birth is  
calculated using the person's age. This introduces some unavoidable imprecision. The information on age 
in the census refers to age on the following days: 15 April, 1 January and 1 April for 1910, 1920 and 1930 
respectively. Given that the reference point is early in a calendar year in all cases, the year of birth is  
calculated as follows: census year – age – 1.The analysis is restricted to children born in the USA as the 
state of birth determines whether the child was born with a birth registration law in place. If foreign 
passports and birth certificates were accepted as proof of age, a share of the children born outside the 
USA will have possessed reliable proof of age. As there is no information about birth registration status in 
the data set, foreign-born children have to be excluded from the analysis  (3.2 percent of the 12-15 year 
old population between 1910-1930).
In this section, the dependent variable is whether the child is employed. Similarly to previous 
studies on child labor, such as Moehling (1999) and Manacorda (2006), employment is based on whether 
the child reports an occupation or not. In this study, occupational coding for the particular census year is 
used.22 This  is  considered  to  reflect  occupation  more  precisely  at  the  relevant  point  in  time  than 
21  Work of children and women was also treated more explicitly in the 1910 than in the 1900 Census (see e.g. Moehling, 2004  
for a discussion on the improvements in the 1910 census as opposed to the 1900 Census). This was also the case for the  
censuses for 1920 and 1930. The 1900 census was suspected of under-counting working children. It is possible that the 1910  
census in turn somewhat over-counted working children in relation to the censuses for 1920 and 1930. These concerns relate  
mainly to farm labor. Regarding children working on farms, the instructions for the enumerators of the 1900 census, which 
included occupation for children aged 10 and above, were somewhat vague: “Enter the older children of a farmer (who works 
on the farm) as farm laborers, except when a father and son (or sons) jointly operate the farm for fixed shares of the product”.  
The instructions for the censuses for the following years included a more explicit section on children working on farms, and 
the treatment remained broadly similar between 1910 and 1930. The 1910 census instructions read: “In the case of children  
who work for their own parents on a farm, the entry in column 18 should be farm laborer and in column 19 home farm; but for 
children who work as farm laborers for others, the entry in column 19 should be working out..” However, for the 1920 and 
1930 Censuses word “regularly” (for work) is included, which might imply that the 1910 Census could over-estimate working  
children somewhat in relation to the 1920 Census. Seasonality has been raised as another potential concern; the 1910 census 
was conducted in April and the 1920 census in January, which could affect the prevalence of reported agricultural employment 
by children (see e.g. Horowitz, 1928). The 1930 census was conducted again in April.  Both the 1910 and 1920 censuses have  
been used in the previous studies on child labor discussed above.
22 1920 codes are used for 1910 and 1920 and 1930 codes for 1930. Those for whom the code is “blank” or “missing” are  
classified  as  not  working.  Those  for  whom  the  code  was  illegible,  or  inconsistent  are  excluded.  Between  1910-1930, 
occupation was reported also by persons who were temporarily unemployed. According to the IPUMS data documentation:  
“the 1920 classification incorporates function as well as setting and sector, and is very detailed. By 1930, the census generally  
equated occupation with workers' functions, and relegated work setting and economic sector to a separate industry variable.”
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occupation  based  on  the  1950  classification,  which  is  the  other  available  alternative.23 Precise 
occupational codes are not comparable between 1910-20 and 1930. However, the codes can be used for 
the purpose of identifying whether, or not, the child has an occupation. Everyone with an occupation code 
is assumed to be working, while those with “no occupation reported” are assumed not to be working. 
This section focuses on children between the age of 12-15. There are several justifications for this. 
This is the age range for which there is most variation in the three censuses in the combination of the core 
variables: dummy variables for the minimum working age law (“child labor law”) and the registration 
law. The first panel in Table 3 illustrates this by cross-tabulating the two variables for the following age 
groups: 6-11, 12-15 and 16-18 for simplicity for the pooled sample for 1910-1930. The lack of variation 
in  the combinations  of  these two laws for 6-11 year  olds and 16-18 year  olds  implies that  it  is  not  
meaningful to estimate models that include these age groups. Additionally, the share of children working 
in the age group of 6-11 is low (between 1-4 percent in different censuses), whereas the share of 12-15 
year olds working in the regression sample varies between 6-23 percent for different censuses.  Table 3 
also includes a cross-tabulation of the compulsory schooling law and the registration law, which will be 
referred to further below. 
Table 3 Cross-tabulation of laws across age groups and census samples (shares of children)
Child labor law =  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when child is below minimum working age. Registration  
law = Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the child was born during, or after, the year of the birth  
registration law.  School  law = Dummy variable  that  takes  a  value of  1  when the child  falls  within the  legal  
schooling age range. See Appendix 1 for details. Sample includes all US-born children residing in 48 U.S. states. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis separately for 
each census year.  The figures show how the share of  children born with a registration law in place 
increased from 18 percent in 1910 to 88 percent in 1930. They also show a significant decline in child 
23 There  are  a  small  number  of  cases  who  have  been  classified  as  not  having  an  occupation  code  with  the  current  
classification, but having one with the 1950s classification. It should be noted that the choice of dependent variable would not 
affect the results of the analysis.
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1910-1930
Registration law
Child labor law 0 1
0 0.04 0.01
1 0.30 0.65
Registration law
Child labor law 0 1
0 0.30 0.22
1 0.19 0.29
Registration law
Child labor law 0 1
0 0.59 0.41
1 0 0
Age: 6-11, N = 383,612
Age: 12-15, N = 240,081
Age:16-18, N = 172,066
1910-1930
Registration law
School law 0 1
0 0.13 0.17
1 0.21 0.49
Registration law
School law 0 1
0 0.15 0.04
1 0.34 0.47
Registration law
School law 0 1
0 0.59 0.38
1 0.01 0.02
Age: 6-11, N = 383,612
Age: 12-15, N = 240,081
Age:16-18, N = 172,066
labor over the period studied, in particular between 1910 and 1920. Child labor was more prevalent in 
rural than in urban areas. A further analysis on occupations reveals that a significant share of children 
employed in rural areas in the 12-15 age group were working as unpaid laborers on the family farm 
(between 65-70% in 1910-1930).24
          Table 4 Summary statistics, means, children 12-15 years
* Refers to a dummy variable. Sample is the one in the regression models in Table 5. 
'Child labor law applies' =  Dummy variable for whether child is below minimum working age. 'Registration law  
applies' = Dummy variable for whether the child was born during, or after, the year of the birth registration law.  
'School law applies'=Dummy variable for whether the child has reached school entry age and is below maximum 
school leaving age'. 'Other non-white' includes all ethnicities other than black and white. The racial categories are  
based on the “Race” variable. Blacks include negros and mulattos. 'Both parents foreign' refers to a case where the 
child  is  native  born,  but  both  parents  are  foreign-born.  No  mother/no  father  indicates  that  no  link  to  a  
mother/father-figure (related or unrelated) is identified in the data. Head literate' refers to whether the head can both 
read and write. 'Number of individuals in hh', where 'hh' refers to household, excludes outlier values above 15.  
'Occupational score' is available for individuals who have an occupation and takes a value up to 80. It is a variable  
that assigns the person's occupation a value that represents the median total income of all individuals with that  
occupation in 1950 (in hundreds of 1950 dollars). It includes values of zero for those without an occupation (the  
regression models control for this with a “missing dummy”). The urban area consists mostly of households in cities 
and incorporated places with 2,500+ inhabitants. 
Figure 2 presents the employment rates of children separately for each census, for two types of 
states of birth; one where all children had been born with a birth registration law in place and another 
where all children had been born prior to the enactment of the registration law. The horizontal axis is the 
24 Based on 1950 occupation codes and calculated for U.S. born children.
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Core variables 1910 1920 1930
Male* 0.51 0.50 0.50
Black* 0.136 0.121 0.105
Other non-white* 0.004 0.003 0.005
Reports an occupation* 0.23 0.11 0.06
  Urban 0.13 0.09 0.03
  Rural 0.28 0.13 0.09
Registration law applies* 0.18 0.36 0.88
Child labor law applies* 0.35 0.49 0.57
School law applies* 0.62 0.87 0.92
Obs. 69276 77469 91108
Additional controls
Both parents foreign* 0.17 0.17 0.18
No mother* 0.10 0.09 0.08
No father* 0.16 0.14 0.14
Head literate* 0.88 0.90 0.92
Occupational score of head 19.88 20.64 21.68
Age of head 46.2 46.02 45.59
Female head* 0.10 0.09 0.09
6.74 6.61 6.37
Urban* 0.37 0.41 0.48
Obs. 68917 76991 90455
Number of individuals in hh
child's age minus the minimum working age in the child's state of residence. In the census years, the 
lowest minimum working age was 12 and the highest 16, implying that the maximum age range covered 
in the graphs is 9-18 years. Children born with a registration law in place were less likely to be employed 
when they are under-aged (-3 to -1), than children born before the registration law was enacted. In 1910 
and 1920, the difference in employment narrows down once children reach minimum working age (0-2). 
This provides initial support for a connection between the effectiveness of child labor law in prohibiting 
under-aged employment and birth registration laws. Here it must be noted that state, or cohort-specific 
factors, that might affect employment, are not controlled for. In 1930, the employment rate of children 
born before a registration law is constantly lower than the rate of those born after. However, there are only 
three states of birth where no one in the age group had been born before a registration law.
Figure 2 Share of working children below and above the minimum working age 
in two groups of birth states
Maximum age range: 9-18. Includes only states with a minimum working age law. 'No registration': states where no 
one had been born with a birth registration law in place. 'All registered': states where everyone had been born on, or 
after a birth registration law was enacted. “Age-minimum age” refers to the age of the child minus the minimum 
legal working age.
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Identification and estimation
Identification of the effects of the birth registration laws relies on the differential timing of these 
laws across states and cohorts within a state.  Since birth registration itself is not observed, but only the 
laws are, the analysis focuses on the effects of the birth registration laws. Complete registration coverage 
was not immediately achieved, possibly due to limited access to registration facilities, birth outside health 
care facilities, or parental ignorance, despite penalties. Therefore, under imperfect enforcement, the effect 
of full birth registration coverage ought to be larger than that induced by the birth registration law. This is 
a common feature of econometric studies on laws, when enforcement is not perfect.
The framework relies on variation in the registration laws (defined at the state of birth and cohort 
level)  and child labor laws (defined at  the state of residence and year level),  after  state of birth and 
residence and cohort effects have been controlled for. The historical account on the enactment of birth 
registration laws in Section 2 suggested that the process might have been affected by factors such as the 
state of health care, the degree of urbanization, or the “progressiveness” of the state. The inclusion of 
state effects in the models guarantees that the identification of the legal effects is not compromised by 
state-specific unobservable variables that are fixed over time, but possibly correlate with the timing of the 
registration law, or the coverage of the minimum working age law. However, unobservable state-specific 
trends in child employment, that may correlate with the enactment of the laws, could be a potential source 
of omitted variable bias. To assess the extent of this concern, state-specific linear cohort trends will be 
controlled for, and a number of robustness checks will be implemented. To further support the case for the 
identification strategy,  a simple regression analysis  in  Appendix 2 shows that  general  socioeconomic 
characteristics across U.S. states do not correlate strongly with the timing of the birth registration laws.
Results will be reported for regression models estimated separately with each census sample and 
with a sample pooled across all three census years. However, the latter constitutes the main analysis, for 
one key reason; lack of variation. The regression sample includes all children between the age of 12 and 
15 who have been born in one of the 48 US states. A share of them do not reside in their state of birth (14  
percent). If census-specific regression models, that control for state of birth effects would be estimated, 
they would rely on very limited variation in the birth registration law dummy variable. The variation 
would derive from those few states where the registration law was timed so that a share of 12-15 years 
olds were born before and a share after the law. In the case of the 1910 census, there are only 2 such states 
of birth out of 48 states. This number rises to 9 out of 48 in 1920, but falls again to 3 for 1930. Therefore,  
the estimated census-specific models will not control for state of birth effects, but only state of residence 
effects, so that additional variation can be derived from children who have moved away from their state of 
birth. However, variation is still limited and comes from a selected group. By pooling the census samples 
for three years together, a broader range of birth cohorts, spanning 20 years, is covered, increasing the 
variation  in  the  birth  registration  variable  within  state  of  birth.  A pooled  model  with  parameter 
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homogeneity does assume that the effects of control variables are homogeneous across the census years.
The full logit model specification with the pooled sample takes the form 
(1) Prob W i=1∣X i=F 01 Rbc2 C say3 Rbc C sayZ i
' cb si
where i refers to individual, b to state of birth, s to state of residence, c to birth cohort, a to age and y to 
census year. The dependent variable, Wi refers to whether, or not, the child reports an occupation. F is a 
logistic function.  Rbc refers to a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the child is born after, or 
during, the year when the birth registration law was enacted. Csay refers to a dummy variable for whether 
the child is too young to obtain a work permit (value 1) and RbcCsay is an interaction term between the 
dummy variables for the minimum working age and the registration law. Rbc varies between birth states 
and between cohorts within a state. For a specific census year, Csay varies between states of residence and 
between age groups within states of residence. In the pooled sample it also varies by census year, as  
minimum age laws changed over time. Zi refers to a vector of control variables.  
The coefficients γb and ψs refer to a set of dummy variables for the child's state of birth and state of 
residence respectively and δc  to a set of dummy variables for the child’s birth cohort, which control for 
factors that are specific to the year of birth.  There is no need to control for age separately since all 
individual cohorts are observed only in one particular census. Thus, the cohort effects also account for age 
effects. Census  year  effects  are  also  redundant  in  this  framework,  as  they  too  are  controlled  for 
completely by the cohort effects.  Specifications that control for linear cohort trends separately for each 
state of birth, are also estimated with the pooled sample. Standard errors in all models are clustered at the 
state of birth × cohort level, given that this is the level at which the registration laws are defined.
The core models are deliberately maintained simple as far as control variables are concerned to 
reduce concerns with endogeneity. However, in a robustness check, a set of control variables is included. 
The interpretation of the coefficients on the legal variables  merits some discussion. Theoretically, 
birth registration laws could have the following effects:
a)  Similar effect on under-aged and work-eligible children: 
     α1 ≠ 0, α3 = 0
b)  Effects only on under-aged children:
     α1 = 0, α3 ≠ 0
c)  Effects only on work-eligible children:
     α1 ≠ 0,  α1 + α3 = 0
d)  Effects on both, but differentially: 
      General case: α1 ≠ 0 and α3 ≠ 0 and α1 + α3 ≠  0 
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      Opposite effects:
i) α1 > 0 and α1 + α3  < 0
ii) α1 < 0 and α1 + α3   > 0
The expected effect based on the hypotheses discussed in Section 4 is b) with α3 < 0. However, d.i) 
was also mentioned as a possibility if birth registration laws increase the likelihood that the under-aged 
are denied work permits, but also facilitate the granting of work permits to the work-eligible. a) would  
seem a more plausible hypothesis if registration affected employment through some other mechanism 
than the granting of work permits. c) and d.ii) appear unlikely, or counter-intuitive. 
The α2 coefficient in equation (1) reflects the effect of the minimum working age legislation on the 
employment of the under-aged in relation to work-eligible children, for children born before a registration 
law. The coefficient α3 captures how this difference in employment between the under-aged and work-
eligible changes when the under-aged are born with a birth registration law. It should be noted that this 
difference may not simply be driven by effects on the under-aged. A reduction in under-aged employment 
may change the demand for work-eligible children, for instance if the two are close substitutes.25
If a reduction in the employment of the under-aged due to the minimum working age law would 
generate a demand effect on the work-eligible, this would be reflected in the coefficients α2 and α3. If birth 
registration laws improve enforcement and reduce under-aged employment further, any demand effect on 
the  work-eligible  could  be  expected  to  be  magnified  with  birth  registration  laws.  However,  it  is 
reasonable to assume that the ratio, α3/α2, which measures the relative improvement in legal enforcement 
due to birth registration laws, remains unaffected by any labor market effects on the work-eligible. 
Finally, two issues should be noted in connection with the interpretation of the coefficients of the 
Logit model. Most of the explanatory variables are dummy variables. It is logical in this situation to  
estimate average marginal effects rather than marginal effects at the means. Secondly, the models include 
the estimation of an interaction effect, for which the average marginal effect and its standard error have to 
be calculated using the delta method (see Ai and Norton, 2003 for details).  
Results of core models
Table 5 shows the results of basic census-specific models. Each model includes dummy variables 
for age, gender, race and state of residence. As the variation in the birth registration law variable within 
state  of  residence  is  limited,  the  models  are  estimated  primarily  for  an  indication  of  the  potential 
differences in the effects of interest across census years. The results for two specifications are shown for  
each year. The first one (1) includes separate dummy variables for the minimum working age law (child 
labor law) and the birth registration law. The second model (2) also includes an interaction term for the 
25 For a general theoretical contribution on how the welfare effects of bans on child labor depend on labor market effects, see 
e.g. Basu and Van (1998), which discusses the distinction between adult and child labor. Bugni (2011) also suggests that a 
difference in differences approach may underestimate the effects of child labor laws on under-aged employment if the resulting  
increase in adult labor leads to a decline also in the employment of work-eligible children.
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two legal dummy variables. 
Table 5 Likelihood that child reports an occupation, census-specific Logit estimates
Notes: **,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Reported coefficients are average marginal effects.  
The sample includes US-born individuals aged 12-15. It excludes individuals who are institutional inmates and 
thus not available for work. All models include cohort dummies and state of residence dummies. Standard errors 
(in brackets) are clustered at state of birth × cohort level. A Wald test is used to test for statistical significance. 
Due to multicollinearity, the 1930 estimation drops individuals residing in Nevada (43 observations).
Starting with 1910, the results in the first column show that children below the minimum working 
age were 10 percentage points less likely to work than work-eligible children. Whether children were 
born with the registration law in place, or not, does not matter at the 5 percent significance level. This  
would  imply  that  the  registration  law  did  not  have  a  common,  independent  effect  on  all  children. 
However, in the second column, the interaction term between the child labor law and birth registration 
law is statistically significantly negative, while the coefficient on the registration law remains statistically 
insignificant, although changes sign. This result supports hypothesis b) above with α3  < 0; that the birth 
registration law reduced the likelihood of employment of legally under-aged children in relation to the 
work-eligible. Under-aged children born before the registration law were around 8 percentage points less 
likely to work than work-eligible children. However, under-aged children born with a registration law in 
place  were  around  19  percentage  points  less  likely  to  work  than  work-eligible  children.  The  birth 
registration law more than doubled the effectiveness of the minimum working age legislation in reducing 
under-aged employment. It did not have a statistically significant independent effect on the employment 
of work-eligible children in 1910, implying that hypotheses d.i) in Section 4 might not hold.
The models for 1920 broadly support the conclusions for 1910, although the effects are smaller. 
Under-aged children born before the registration law were 3.4 percentage points less likely to work than 
the  work-eligible  children.  Under-aged  children  born  with  a  registration  law  in  place  were  12.4 
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1910 1920 1930
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Registration law -.027 .012 -.018 .031 .007 .008
Child labor law -.100 -.077 -.058 -.034 -.001 .003
-.116 -.090 -.005
     Registration law
Male .158 .159 .080 .080 .048 .048
Black .125 .124 .075 .073 .051 .051
Other non-white -.036 -.035 -.022 -.022 .042 .042
Obs. 69276 69276 77469 77469 91065 91065
Log-likelihood -29177 -29062 -22809 -22636 -17041 -17041
[.017] [.023] [.010] [.012]** [.004]* [.004]*
[.015]** [.016]** [.009]** [.009]** [.007] [.008]
Child labor law  × 
[.026]** [.014]** [.005]
[.006]** [.006]** [.003]** [.003]** [.003]** [.003]**
[.007]** [.007]** [.005]** [.005]** [.003]** [.003]**
[.028] [.027] [.024] [.024] [.020]* [.020]*
percentage points less likely to work than the work-eligible. However, a part of this difference stems from 
the fact that the registration law also has a statistically significant direct positive effect on work-eligible 
children,  suggesting that the birth registration law may have facilitated the employment of the work-
eligible. Work-eligible children born with a registration law were around 3 percentage points more likely 
to work than work-eligible children born without a registration law. 
The results for 1930 are rather different. Children below minimum working age are no longer less 
likely to work than work-eligible children. In both models 1 and 2, the birth registration law alone has a  
statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of everyone's employment. It should be noted, that 
there is still some, but less, variation in the child labor law dummy variable. By this time, the incidence of 
child labor itself had also fallen to low levels and 88 percent of children had been born with a birth 
registration law in place. 
The results indicate that the minimum working age legislation reduced the likelihood of under-
aged employment in 1910 and 1920. The birth registration laws also made the minimum working age law 
more effective in reducing under-aged employment, but possibly also facilitated the employment of work-
eligible children. These results no longer hold for 1930 when child employment had fallen to a low level 
and the minimum working age law had ceased to make a difference for the employment for 12-15 year 
olds. It should be stressed that the results must be considered in light of the limitations of the census-
specific approach discussed above. 
The next step is to estimate a set of models with a pooled data set consisting of all three survey 
samples, for 1910, 1920 and 1930. The results of a set of such models are shown in Table 6. 
The first column in Table 6 shows the coefficients for the legal variables of interest in a model that 
excludes  the  interaction  term.  This  suggests  that  the  birth  registration  law did  not  have  a  common 
statistically  significant  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  employment  of  all  children.  Children  below  the 
minimum working age were 5 percentage points less likely to work than the work-eligible children. 
In  model  2,  which includes  the  interaction  term,  the coefficients  on both the  child  labor  law 
variable and the interaction term are statistically significantly negative. The coefficient on the registration 
law  remains  statistically  insignificant.  When  born  before  the  registration  law,  children  below  the 
minimum age were 3.6 percentage points less likely to work than work-eligible children. However, when 
born with a birth registration law in place, those below the minimum age were 9 percentage points less 
likely to work than the work-eligible. Again, these results imply that a birth registration law more than  
doubled the effectiveness of the minimum working age legislation in reducing the employment of the 
under-aged in relation to the work-eligible. Some of the difference between the employment of the under-
aged and work-eligible could result from demand effects on the work-eligible. The results suggest that the 
birth registration law did not have an independent effect on the employment of work-eligible children, 
implying that proof of age did not directly facilitate their employment. 
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Table 6 Likelihood that child reports an occupation, pooled Logit estimates
Notes: **,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Reported coefficients are average marginal effects. 
The sample includes US-born individuals aged 12-15. It excludes individuals who are institutional inmates and thus 
not available for work.  All models include dummy variables for year of birth, race (black and other non-white),  
gender as well as state of birth and state of residence. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the state  of birth 
× cohort level. A Wald test is used to test for statistical significance. Model (4) equals (3) with a range of control  
variables: dummy variables for both parents foreign, no mother, no father, literate head of household, female head 
of household, urban location and variables on the occupational score of the head of household (including missing 
dummy for those without occupation), number of individuals in the household, age of head. Model (5) relies on an 
alternative child labor law indicator instead of that in the previous models (See Appendix 1). The average value for  
this indicator in the regression sample is 0.36 in 1910, 0.54 in 1920 and 0.65 in 1930. In Model (6) the registration 
law is assumed to have been implemented a year later in each state. In Model (7) the registration law dummy 
variable is based on the year from which the state Office of Vital Statistics holds birth records (Table A1). Model  
(8) is similar to Model (3) with the addition of the 'school law' dummy.
Model 3 includes cohort trends for each state of birth. The results change little, which supports the 
identifying assumption that the enactment of registration laws was not correlated with unobservable state- 
specific  trends  in  child  employment.  Model  4  demonstrates  that  the  results  are  not  sensitive  to  the 
inclusion of a range of control variables (listed in the notes to Table 6).
Model 5 relies on an alternative indicator on whether the child is below minimum working age. 
The indicator is defined precisely in Appendix 1, and it incorporates the length of education requirement 
for receiving a work permit in the state of residence if such was specified. The conclusion regarding the 
effects of the laws remain unchanged. 
Models 6 and 7 rely on alternative ways of defining the timing of the birth registration law. Since 
the month of year when the law became effective is generally not defined in the source used, not all 
children  born in  that  year  will  have  been affected  by the law.  Firstly,  an alternative  specification is 
estimated,  where the birth registration law is assumed to have become effective in the year after the 
implementation year for all states (model 6). Again, the coefficients of interest change little. In model 7, 
instead of the year of the birth registration law, the year from which the states' Offices of Vital Statistics 
(Table A1, Appendix 1) hold birth records, is used to construct a dummy variable for whether state-level 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Registration law -.007 .011 .005 .005 .005 .017 .005 -.003
Child labor law -.048 -.036 -.039 -.038 -.034 -.038 -.037 -.037
Child labor law -.053 -.050 -.050 -.046 -.052 -.052 -.051
School law .005
School law .013
Obs. 237853 237853 237853 236363 237853 237853 237853 237853
State of birth trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
(based on birth year)
Log-likelihood -69446 -69285 -69169 -66599 -69189 -69185 -69161 -69156
[.007] [.010] [.014] [.014] [.014] [.015] [.015] [.015]
[.007]** [.008]** [.008]** [.008]** [.008]** [.008]** [.009]** [.008]**
    ×  Registration law [.012]** [.013]** [.013]** [.013]** [.014]** [.014]** [.014]**
[.008]
    ×  Registration law [.013]
registration existed at the time the child was born.26 Again, the conclusions hold. 
So far the analysis has focused exclusively on the minimum working age legislation. The last 
model  (8) in Table 6 incorporates a dummy variable for whether  the child is  within the compulsory 
schooling age range (“school law”), and its interaction with the registration law dummy. However, neither 
the schooling law nor its interaction with the registration law are statistically significantly connected with 
the likelihood of an occupation.27 The coefficients on the child labor law dummy and its interaction with 
the registration law change little. The result supports the claim that for the age group concerned, the 
binding constraint for work was the minimum working age and not the compulsory schooling age.
Overall, the results remain robust to the way in which the birth registration and child labor law 
variables are defined and to the inclusion of an additional indicator on compulsory schooling laws. The 
results demonstrate that minimum working age legislation was more effective in reducing the likelihood 
of  under-aged  employment  in  relation  to  the  work-eligible  when  children  had  been  born  with  a 
registration law in place. In none of the pooled models has the birth registration law had a statistically 
significant independent effect on the employment of work-eligible children,  although there was some 
indication of this in the census-specific models. Overall, support for the hypothesis d.i), that registration 
laws may have directly facilitated the employment of the work-eligible, is weak.
Additional robustness checks 
The identification of the effect of the birth registration law relies on the assumption that the timing 
of the enactment of the registration law is not correlated with unobservable state trends in child labor. 
Table 7 reports the results of a 'falsification' test, which is performed to analyze the sensitivity of the 
results to the year of the birth registration law. 
The falsification test focuses on whether the estimated effect could be capturing a “pre-enactment” 
trend in child employment. The sample is restricted to individuals born before the birth registration law 
was enacted.  This guarantees that there are no individuals in the sample who in reality were already 
affected by the registration law. It is then assumed that the birth registration law in each state in the 
sample was enacted three, four, five, or six years before its actual date. These years were chosen to be 
sufficiently, but not too close, to the actual year, so that a sufficient share of individuals can be considered 
affected by the false registration law. The main regression specification is then estimated for this sample 
of the pooled data set for 1910-1930. Unless the registration law dummy captures a “pre-enactment” trend 
for the cohorts, one would expect no meaningful results for the registration law nor its interaction effect.  
26 If several years are listed in Table A1, the earliest one is used. If the records start from late in the year, the following year is
assumed as the year from which records are available.
27 Had the child labor law dummy and its interaction with the registration law dummy been omitted, the interaction term for
the schooling law would be statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient on the schooling law itself would be statistically
significantly positive, which is unexpected and again suggests that for the particular age group concerned, the schooling law
did not constrain employment decisions.
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This is largely confirmed. Neither the coefficient on the registration law, nor on the interaction term, is 
statistically significant, with one exception in the last column.
 Table 7 Falsification test: Likelihood that child reports an occupation, pooled sample
Notes: **,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Reported coefficients are average marginal effects.  
The sample includes US-born individuals aged 12-15. It excludes individuals who are institutional inmates and thus 
not available for work.  All models include dummy variables for year of birth, race (black and other non-white),  
gender as well as state of birth and state of residence. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at state  of birth × 
cohort  level. A Wald test is used to test for statistical significance. The sample includes all those children in the  
original regression sample who have been born prior to the enactment of the birth registration law.
Some of the previous studies on child labor in the U.S. have restricted attention to non-agricultural 
households or urban households. As discussed earlier, child labor laws may not have been applicable to 
agricultural activities, or cases where the child was employed by parents, although the coverage did vary 
across states. In rural areas and agricultural households, children may have worked on the family farm, 
and would not be expected to have work permits, or were not visited by factory inspectors. Thus, the 
focus on the use of birth certificates as a proof of age for obtaining work permits, may not be relevant. 
The first two columns in Table 8 report the results of the core model specification for the pooled 
sample separately for urban and rural individuals. There are no significant differences between the results 
of the urban and rural samples. In urban areas, under-aged children born before the registration laws were 
2.7 percentage points less likely to work, and in rural areas, 2.6 percentage points less likely to work than 
work-eligible children. However, the under-aged were around 6 percentage points less likely to work in 
both rural and urban areas when they had been born with a birth registration law. It should be noted that 
by dividing the sample into two, the coefficients for the control variables (such as cohort effects) are 
allowed to vary, which can explain why the effect of the minimum age limit is smaller in the models in  
Table 8 than in the models in Table 6. The similarities in urban and rural areas may appear surprising 
given that the minimum age limit was assumed to be less well enforced, or irrelevant for agricultural 
work. However, firstly it is important to recognize that between 1910-30, the average share of children 
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Early implementation
3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 
Registration law .021 .028 .033 .039
Child labor law -.038 -.051 -.049 -.048
Child labor law -.016 -.018 -.024 -.017
Obs. 117239 117239 117239 117239
State of birth trends YES YES YES YES
(based on birth year)
Share born with 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.33
“false”registration law
[.021] [.024] [.025] [.018]*
[.008]** [.010]** [.010]** [.010]**
    ×  Registration law [.018] [.022] [.019] [.017]
working in rural areas (17 percent) was over twice the share in urban areas (7 percent), which implies that 
the relative effect of the minimum age law was larger in urban areas. Secondly, it should be emphasized 
that farm labor was not the only gainful activity that children could engage in in rural areas. In some areas 
in particular, children worked for instance in cotton mills or fruit canneries.
Table 8 Urban-rural and racial differences: Likelihood that child reports an occupation, 
pooled sample
Notes: **,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Reported coefficients are average marginal effects.  
The sample includes US-born individuals aged 12-15. It excludes individuals who are institutional inmates and thus 
not available for work.  All models include dummy variables for year of birth, race (black and other non-white),  
gender as well as state of birth and state of residence. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the state  of birth 
× cohort level. A Wald test is used to test for statistical significance. The urban area consists mostly of households 
in cities and incorporated places with 2,500+ inhabitants. Agricultural (Agr.) counties are those where the share of 
individuals working in agriculture was above 50 percent in 1910 and non-agricultural (Non-agr.) those where the 
share of individuals working in agriculture was equal or below 50 percent in 1910. 
In order to investigate the relevance of child labor laws and birth registration laws for agricultural 
areas further, the sample is divided in two depending on the average share of all employed individuals  
who worked in agriculture in the child's county of residence in 1910.28 The model is then re-estimated for 
these samples. “Agricultural counties” are those where the share of individuals (of all ages) working in 
agriculture is above 50 percent, and the remainder are classified as “non-agricultural” counties. In the 
former category, between 1910-1930, on average 22 percent of the children in the regression sample were 
employed  and  71  percent  of  these  children  worked  as  “unpaid  family  workers  on  farms”.  In  non-
agricultural  counties,  8 percent  of the children in the regression sample were employed and only 19 
percent worked as unpaid family workers on farms. Columns 3 and 4 show that the minimum age limit 
affected employment in agricultural counties somewhat less than in non-agricultural counties. Neither the 
interaction term, nor the birth registration law dummy are statistically significant in agricultural counties, 
implying  that  the  registration  law  did  not  affect  the  likelihood  of  employment.  In  non-agricultural 
counties, children below the minimum age limit were 3 percentage points less likely to work than the 
work-eligible if they were born without a birth registration law, but over 6 percentage points less likely to 
work if they were born with birth registration laws.
28 Based on 1950 industry codes.
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Urban Rural
counties counties White Black
Registration law .012 -.003 .001 .012 .009 -.004
Child labor law -.027 -.026 -.016 -.029 -.037 -.007
Child labor law -.030 -.033 -.014 -.034 -.044 .017
Obs. 101272 136581 85015 152823 208643 28240
State of birth trends YES YES YES YES
(based on birth year)
Agr. Non-agr.
[.008] [.010] [.008] [.008] [.010] [.012]
[.007]** [.006]** [.006]** [.006]** [.008]** [.012]
 × Registration law [.007]** [.010]** [.010] [.008]** [.010]** [.019]
The  distinction  between  children  in  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  counties  supports  the 
explanation that birth registration laws improved the enforcement of minimum working age legislation 
through the provision of official proof of age, when employment certificates were applicable. In counties 
where agriculture was a dominant activity, children were far more likely to be employed in agriculture 
and family farms, where work permits were typically not relevant. Birth registration was less relevant for 
the minimum working age legislation, and the latter was less connected to employment decisions.
Black children worked predominantly in agriculture, and may in general have been neglected in 
law enforcement, or due to weaker of access to health care, were less likely to be registered. The last two 
columns in Table 8 show that the minimum age limit had no effect on the employment of black children,  
regardless of registration laws.29 The minimum age limit did affect the employment of white children, and 
was more effective for white children born with a birth registration law.
Given that the census focuses on households, it may appear tempting to estimate household fixed 
effects  models as these control more specifically for household specific factors that would affect the 
likelihood of employment.  However,  there are limitations. Within household variation is limited with 
respect to the birth registration law. It would be derived from households with multiple children between 
12-15 years of age, who either were born in one of the few states where the timing leads to variation  
within this age group, or where the siblings had been born in different states. Secondly, the minimum 
working age may affect intra-household labor market decisions and the employment of work-eligible 
siblings. However, to provide some indication of the implications of household fixed effects, the results of 
a few linear probability household fixed effects specifications are shown in Table A4 in Appendix 3. With 
a few exceptions, the conclusions remain broadly similar to the ones from the above analysis.
To end with, Appendix 3 also discusses the possibility that the age of those individuals born prior 
to a birth registration law would be misreported in the census, and the potential implications.
6 Birth registration laws and education 
The analysis so far has focused on child labor as the outcome of interest, given that this is the 
direct target of minimum working age legislation. However, it would be of interest to know whether the 
reduced  likelihood  of  under-aged  employment  translates  into  an  increased  likelihood  of  school 
attendance, with the potential for increased educational attainment. This could have longer term welfare 
implications. Secondly, the ability to confirm age with birth certificates may have improved, not just the 
enforcement of the minimum working age law, but also the enforcement of compulsory schooling age 
laws. This Section begins by analyzing school attendance as the outcome with the 1910-1930 sample and 
then discusses the results of a retrospective analysis on educational attainment with the 1960 census.
29 The models do not include state trends as they could not be estimated with such for the black sub-sample.
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School attendance and birth registration
The only variable available in the 1910-1930 censuses on the schooling of children is whether they 
attended school, or were enrolled in school, any time since September in the previous year. Since the 
census dates varied, the reference time varies from within past 4 months to within past 7.5 months in the 
three Census  samples.  As acknowledged for  instance by Moehling (2004),  who compares  figures on 
reported attendance and school enrollment, this variable does not capture regular attendance well, and the 
figures are closer to enrollment. In the sample of 12-15 year olds used in Section 5, the reported school 
attendance rates were 0.87, 0.90 and 0.91 for 1910, 1920 and 1930 respectively.  A significant share of 
children who reported having an occupation in the pooled data, also reported having attended school (60-
66 percent),  which implies that  children either  attended school  irregularly,  or worked outside school 
hours.30 Data on months of school attended are not available in these censuses.31 The analysis relies on a 
dummy variable for reported school attendance as the dependent variable in the regression analysis.
In order to assess whether the connection between the birth registration law and the minimum 
working legislation had implications for schooling,  a regression model with school attendance as the 
dependent variable is estimated for 12-15 year olds with the pooled 1910-1930 sample. The model is 
otherwise identical to the core model specification in Table 6. The results, shown in the first column of 
Table 9, confirm that the minimum working age law affected the likelihood of school attendance and the 
positive effect was larger with registration laws. Children below the minimum age who were born before 
the registration law, were 3.8 percentage points more likely to attend school than the work-eligible. Those 
born with a birth registration law were 6.4 percentage points more likely to attend school.
To analyze the relevance of birth registration for compulsory schooling laws, a few additional 
models are estimated. To keep the presentation concise, only pooled models are estimated. As a direct 
comparison with the results of model 1 on the minimum working age, the same model specification for 
12-15 year olds is estimated with the compulsory schooling law dummy variable as opposed to the child 
labor law variable. Again the schooling law dummy is based on the legal age of school entry and  exit 
rather than the length of schooling requirements for school exit or work, given that birth certificates as 
such would not prove directly useful in the verification of the latter. Model 2 indicates that school-aged 
children were 2.2 more likely to attend school than those outside the compulsory age range when they had 
been born with a registration law in place. The registration law did not have an independent effect on the 
attendance of children outside the compulsory schooling range. 
A comparison of the results in models 1 and 2 implies that for the 12-15 age range, the minimum 
working age was a more relevant constraint than the legal school leaving age, as suggested for instance by 
Goldin and Katz (2008). This is confirmed by model 3, which includes both the schooling and child labor 
30 Or attended a continuation school (see Section on educational attainment below for details).
31 In principle, the 1950 occupational classification includes a category for “student”, but there are next to no entries in this  
occupational category in the 1910-1930 censuses. 
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law variables and interaction terms with the registration law variable. Only the coefficients for the child 
labor law dummy and its interaction term are statistically significant and resemble those in column 1.32
Table 9 Likelihood that child attends school, pooled Logit estimates
**,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Estimated coefficients are average marginal effects. The 
sample includes US-born individuals. The logit models include dummies for gender, race  (black and other non-
white), birth cohort, state of birth and state of residence. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the state of 
birth × cohort level. A Wald test is used to test for statistical significance. 
Model 4 is estimated for an age range for which the variation in the schooling law dummy relates 
to the legal school entry age (6-11 year olds). As discussed above, the variation in the combination of the 
registration law and the child labor law dummy variable is very low for the 6-11 age group, so it is only 
meaningful to focus on the schooling law (see Table 3). The share of U.S. born children in the 6-11 age 
group who are of compulsory schooling age is 0.58, 0.71 and 0.78 for 1910, 1920 and 1930 respectively.  
The share of children in this age group who report attending school is 0.86, 0.91 and 0.88 percent for  
1910, 1920 and 1930 respectively. The results show that in the 6-11 year age group, only when children 
had been born with a registration law in place, were school-aged children more likely to attend school  
than  those  outside  the  compulsory  schooling  age  range.  The  estimated  effect  corresponds  to  a  2.5 
percentage  point  difference  in  the  likelihood  of  school  attendance,  which  suggests  that  the  age 
requirements for younger children were somewhat better enforced with official proof of age. 
Overall,  there  is  some  evidence  that  birth  registration  laws  improved  the  enforcement  of 
compulsory schooling age laws, in particular regarding the school entry age.  For the 12-15 year age 
group, the minimum working age appears to have been a more relevant factor for school attendance than 
the school leaving age. The effects of the schooling laws may appear weak, or small, since the reported 
32 The conclusions would remain similar with an alternative indicator for the compulsory schooling age, that utilizes the
requirement on years of education to be completed for an exemption (similar to alternative child labor law indicator).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age: 12-15 Age: 6-11
Registration law .006 -.004 -.002 -.007
Child labor law .038 .040
Child labor law .026 .025
School law -.012 -.001 -.006
School law .022 .012 .025
Obs. 238399 238399 238399 381398
State of birth trends YES YES YES YES
(based on birth year)
Log-likelihood -68782 -68998 -68777 -105093
[.008] [.009] [.009] [.007]
   [.008]**     [.008]**
    ×  Registration law   [.008]**     [.009]**
[.007]  [.008] [.007]
    ×  Registration law [.009]*  [.010]     [.006]**
attendance rates are fairly high, although they are unlikely to capture regular attendance accurately.
Educational attainment and birth registration
The variable on school attendance is not without limitations. It is uncertain whether increases in 
reported attendance translated into increases in total  years of education. Some of the research on the 
effects of child labor and compulsory schooling laws on education in the U.S. has taken a retrospective 
approach by analyzing the contribution of the laws to educational attainment of adults with a later census. 
Lleras-Muney (2002) and Goldin and Katz (2008) both use the 1960 census. This section utilizes a similar 
estimation framework, incorporating birth registration laws as an additional dimension. It also relies on 
the 1 percent sample of the 1960 U.S. census (IPUMS-USA, Ruggles et al. 2010).
The 1960 census includes data on the quarter of birth and age, which are used to calculate the birth 
year of a child, and determine whether the individual was born with a birth registration law in place or 
not. As was the practice in Lleras-Muney (2002), with respect to the legal minimum working age and 
school leaving age, the laws that applied in the state of birth when the child was 14, is used. With respect  
to the school entry age, the law that applied in the state of birth when the child was 7, is used (similar to  
Goldin and Katz, 2008). The data on child labor laws is available from 1910. Those who were 14 in 1910, 
were born in 1896. The data on the schooling and child labor laws ends in 1939, when those born in 1925 
would have been 14 years olds. Given that delayed registration became more common in the 1940s, the 
analysis focuses on individuals who had reached compulsory schooling age by the 1940s. Therefore, as in 
Goldin and Katz (2008), the models rely on a sample of individuals born between 1896-1925.  Again, the 
analysis  relies  on age rather than length of schooling requirements.  Birth  certificates should only be 
directly relevant for the former,  and the use of age requirements allows for a separation between the 
effects of the legal school entry and legal leaving age, or working age.33 
Controlling for the legal entry age, we would expect a higher school leaving age, or minimum 
working age, to lead to higher educational attainment. Vice versa, controlling for the leaving age, we 
would expect a higher legal entry age to reduce educational attainment. In comparison with those born 
before a birth registration law, individuals born with a birth registration law could be expected to be more 
likely to enter school at the required age and to stay in school until the minimum legal leaving age (either 
based on the working age or schooling age, depending on which was the true binding constraint). It  is 
realistic to assume that overall better enforcement of the age requirements would lengthen the time spent 
in school. The results earlier indicated that registration laws largely did not facilitate the employment of 
children above the minimum working age, or lower attendance of children below the school entry age. 
33 Goldin and Katz (2008) used the minimum age requirements together with the length of schooling requirements for work, or 
an exemption from schooling, to construct indicators on the number of years an individual born in a certain year was required 
to spend in school. Separate indicators were calculated for required “child labor school years” and “compulsory school years”,  
which correlate highly with each other. It can be noted that had such indicators been included in the regression models (to be 
described below) instead of the legal age requirements, the conclusions on the effects of birth registration laws would hold.
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In the sample of individuals born in the U.S. between 1896-1925, only 2 percent lived in a state 
without a legal minimum working age, or a school leaving age when they were 14, and 7 percent in a 
state without a legal school entry age when they were 7. Therefore,  there is a very limited group of  
individuals without legal age requirements (value 0) as opposed to those with such requirements. In order 
to simplify interpretation, the analysis is restricted to individuals with a non-zero value for all the legal  
age requirements. 
It is likely that regardless of the age requirement, children reluctant to attend school would be able 
to falsify their age by a fairly fixed margin, not larger than a few years. Children beyond this margin 
would  be  physically  identifiable  as  over,  or  under-aged.  The  effect  of  the  birth  registration  law  on 
educational  attainment  would  not  be  expected  to  vary  significantly  depending  on  the  legal  age 
requirement.  It  would  not  be  appropriately  captured  with  an  interaction  term  with  the  legal  age 
requirements, but could rather be expected to be a positive constant across the age requirements. This is  
the assumption used in the estimated regression models. The limitation is that it cannot be confirmed 
whether any effect of birth registration laws on attainment would be the result of improved enforcement 
of the age requirements, or another factor, such as improved educational planning.
The following OLS model is estimated for the sample of individual to whom the age laws applied: 
(2) EDi=01 Rbc2 Cbc3 S bc4CN bcZ i
'cb i
where i refers to an individual, b to the state of birth and c to the birth cohort. EDi  refers to the years of 
education completed,  Cbc is either the minimum working age or school leaving age, and  Sbc the school 
entry age,  Rbc refers to a dummy variable for whether the child is born with a registration law in place. 
The coefficient γb relates to state of birth effects and δc to cohort effects. Zi refers to a vector of control 
variables, which for simplicity only includes dummy variables for gender and race. The models now also 
include a dummy variable  for  whether  the state  of  birth  had a  continuation schooling law when the 
individual was 14 years old (CNbc), given that this has been studied in previous research and could affect 
attainment.  These laws required working children who had a work permit,  but were below the legal 
school leaving age, to attend school, generally for four to eight hours per week (see Goldin and Katz, 
2008). In the sample,  for the 1896 cohort, no birth states had such a law, but the prevalence increased 
steadily over time, covering 64 percent of the 1925 birth cohort.
For simplicity, the models are estimated across the entire educational distribution. As a robustness 
check, a model with cohort effects for each census region of birth is also estimated, to control for the 
possibility that developments in educational attainment varied by region (as in  Lleras-Muney,  2002). 
There are four census regions (Northeast,  Midwest,  South and West).  The summary statistics for the 
variables of interest are reported in Table 10.  The results of the regression models are shown in Table 11. 
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Table 10 Summary statistics for the 1960 sample (birth cohorts: 1896-1925)
1 legal age at the age of 14 in the state of birth,  2 legal age at the age of 7 in the state of birth. The sample excludes 
individuals whose state of birth did not have a legal working age, or schooling age when the individual was 14 or 7.  
Only U.S. born individuals, in the 48 states for which the date of the registration law is defined, are included.
Table 11 Years of Education in 1960 (birth cohorts: 1896-1925), OLS 
**,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Sample: Table 10. Standard errors (brackets) are clustered 
at the state of birth  × cohort  level.  All models include dummies for gender, race  (black, other non-white), birth 
cohort and state of birth. In models 3 and 5, birth cohort dummies are specific to region of birth. In model 6, the 
sample also includes individuals for whom one, or more of the working and schooling age requirements did not 
exist (value 0). 'Missing dummies' are included to control for this. In models 7 and 8, the sample is restricted to  
individuals born before a registration law. The registration law is assumed to have been enacted 3 or 5 years earlier. 
Model 1 includes only the registration law dummy as an explanatory legal variable. The results 
indicate that the birth registration law was related to educational attainment; those born with the law in 
place had on average 0.06 more years of education.
The next models include the legal minimum working age and schooling age variables, mainly to 
analyze whether this changes the effect of the birth registration laws significantly. Both the legal entry age 
and exit  age  are  controlled  for  in  the  same model,  in  order  to  estimate  the  effect  of  the  entry age 
controlling for  the  exit  age and vice versa.  However,  given the  high correlation  between the school 
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3 years 5 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Registration law .061 .068 .088 .061 .097 .073 -.017 .026
School entry age -.004 .000 -.013 -.013 -.029
Minimum working age .085 .078 .042
School leaving age .006 -.007
Continuation school .058 .112 .044 .105
Obs. 507808 507808 507808 507808 507808 545424 136425 136425
YES YES YES
cohort dummies
R² 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.10
[.023]** [.023]** [.023]** [.023]** [.023]** [.023]** [.028] [.029]
[.020] [.019] [.021] [.019] [.019]
[.016]** [.016]** [.014]**
[.015] [.015]
[.028]* [.027]** [.028] [.027]**
Region of birth ×
Obs. 507,808
Mean St.dev
Education in years 10.23 3.37
White 0.92 0.28
Black 0.08 0.27
Other non-white 0.003 0.06
Female 0.51 0.50
14.29 0.68
7.47 0.55
15.81 1.00
0.50 0.50
Born with registration law 0.73 0.44
Minimum working age1
School entry age2
School leaving age1
Continuation schooling law dummy1
leaving age and the minimum working age (0.82 across sample), separate models are estimated including 
the school leaving and the minimum working age. All models include the continuation schooling dummy.
Models 2 and 4 are identical to Model 1, with the addition of the legal variables. The coefficients 
on the birth registration dummy remain significant and change little in magnitude. The school entry and 
leaving age are statistically insignificant.  A one year  higher minimum working age is  found to raise 
attainment by around 0.085 years and the continuation schooling law by 0.06 years. Models 3 and 5 
include cohort effects that are specific to each census region of birth. The effect of the birth registration 
law increases in magnitude, and remains statistically significant. Although Goldin and Katz (2008) relied 
on length of schooling requirements, the conclusions with respect to the child labor and schooling law 
variables are rather similar. The contribution here relates to the inclusion of the birth registration laws.
So far the sample has been restricted to individuals for whom the working or schooling age laws 
applied. Since this is a selected sample, Model 6 also includes those individuals with a value of zero for  
any of the legal age requirements.34 The model is otherwise similar to Model 3. The coefficients are not 
shown,  but  dummy variables  for  the  absence  of  each legal  age  requirement  are  included.  The  birth 
registration law variable remains statistically significant with a slightly smaller coefficient. This is not 
surprising as the sample now includes individuals for whom there were no age laws to enforce.
The last two columns show the results of a falsification test similar to that in Table 7. The model 
specification is similar to Model 1 (Table 11), but the estimation relies only on individuals born before a 
registration law. The registration law is assumed to have been implemented either three, or five years 
earlier. If the implementation of the registration law correlates with pre-enactment trends in schooling, the 
coefficient on the birth registration law variable would be statistically significant. This is not the case.
To conclude, there is evidence that birth registration laws raised educational attainment by 0.06-
0.1 years. The results in Table 11 do not definitively identity the channel, but based on all the evidence,  
the likely explanation is the improved enforcement of the legal age requirements. For individuals born in 
the U.S. between 1896-1925, the average educational attainment increased from 8.7 to 11 years. A 0.1 
year increase in attainment due to the birth registration laws would explain 4 percent of this increase. 
7 Conclusions
Birth registration has been a little explored topic by economists and a neglected aspect in the study 
of the effects of legislation that specifies age limits or age requirements. This study has shown that state-
level laws on birth registration improved the enforcement of minimum working age legislation and to 
some extent also compulsory schooling legislation in early 20th century USA. The suggested channel of 
effect is the use of birth certificates as formal proof of age. It is also shown that birth registration laws had 
long-term implications by raising educational attainment.
34 In this full sample, the mean for the registration law variable is 0.69.
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The identification of the legal effects has relied on a framework that controls for state and birth 
cohort effects. Therefore, any time invariant, state-specific and cohort-specific characteristics that might 
correlate with the timing of the birth registration laws, have been controlled for. Most models also control  
for state of birth specific trends. A state-level regression analysis on the timing of the birth registration 
laws suggests  that  “pre-enactment” levels,  or trends,  in  core socioeconomic variables  are  mostly not 
associated with the timing. Given that birth registration coverage was not complete from the enactment of 
the registration laws, it is possible that the study still underestimates the effect of birth registration.
The results of the pooled models with a sample of 12-15 year olds for 1910-1930 show that the 
minimum  working  age  legislation  was  more  effective  in  reducing  the  likelihood  of  under-aged 
employment when children had been born with a birth registration law in place. On aggregate, between 
1910 and 1930, under-aged children born with a registration law in place were around 9 percentage points 
less likely to work than work-eligible children. When they had been born prior to a birth registration law, 
under-aged children were around 3-4 percentage points less likely to work than work-eligible children. 
Therefore,  birth  registration  doubled  the  effectiveness  of  minimum working age  legislation.  Census-
specific estimations suggest that the results are driven by the 1910 and 1920 censuses. By 1930, the 
incidence of child labor had fallen to a low level, and minimum working age legislation was less relevant. 
 A further investigation suggests that the impact of birth registration laws on the enforcement of 
minimum age legislation was limited to children residing in counties, where the majority of individuals 
worked outside agriculture. In such counties, working children were also much more likely to engage in 
non-agricultural  activities,  where  work  permits  were  required.  This  supports  the  conclusion  that  the 
channel of effect was the use of birth certificates to ascertain a child's true age in the process of granting 
work permits. The minimum working age limit  did not affect the likelihood of employment of black 
children, irrespective of birth registration laws. Birth registration laws did enhance the effectiveness of the 
minimum working age legislation for white children.
The results also confirm that the connection between the birth registration law and the minimum 
working age legislation had implications for school attendance of 12-15 year olds between 1910-1930. 
Children below the minimum working age were generally more likely to report attending school than 
work-eligible children, but even more likely to do so when born with a birth registration law.
With respect to compulsory schooling requirements, the findings indicate that between 1910-1930 
the  school  leaving  age  was  not  necessarily  a  relevant  constraint  for  decisions  on  schooling  and 
employment for the 12-15 year age group, irrespective of birth registration laws. However, in a sample of 
younger children (6-11), those within the compulsory schooling age range were 2.5 percentage points 
more likely to attend school than those outside the compulsory schooling range, but only when children 
had been born with a birth registration law in place. The data on school attendance does not capture full-
time attendance well and the reported school attendance rates were rather high. Nevertheless, the result 
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for younger children indicates that the schooling age requirements were more strictly adhered to when 
children had official proof of age. Most of the results suggest that registration laws had implications for 
the  employment,  and  to  an  extent  the  school  attendance  of  the  under-aged,  but  did  not  have  an 
independent effect on the work-eligible, or those who had reached the school leaving age.   
The retrospective analysis finds that individuals born with a birth registration law in place had 
0.06-0.1 more years of education than those born without. In this case, the models estimate the general 
effect of birth registration laws. Considering all the evidence together, this is likely to be explained by the 
improved enforcement of the minimum working age and compulsory schooling age laws. 
Overall, the results imply that legislation that sets age requirements is more likely to be enforced 
with  a  functioning  birth  registration  system in  place.  The  findings  indicate  that  the  neglect  of  birth 
registration as an enforcement institution can affect estimates on the significance of minimum working 
age, or compulsory schooling age laws, as well as other laws that specify age requirements. This could 
explain why some of the previous studies have found relatively small effects of such laws on child labor 
or educational attainment. Although this study focuses on a historical period, the results remain relevant  
for today's developing countries. Child labor and the implementation of compulsory schooling continue to 
be timely issues (see e.g.  Fyfe,  2005). Many developing countries also have far from complete birth 
registration coverage, and new birth registration laws, or amendments to old ones have been implemented 
recently (see e.g. Cody, 2009). 
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Appendix 1 Data and variables
Birth registration laws
The dates  for  birth  registration  laws in  each states  are  obtained from an article  by Elizabeth 
Nichols (1980), in Everton's Genealogical Helper. The article can be accessed electronically from World 
Vital  Records  databases  (http://www.worldvitalrecords.co  m  )  or  as  a  reprint  from 
http://www.progenealogists.com/unitedstatesvitalrecords.htm (last accessed 1 February 2012). The dates 
refer to the year when a state-wide law making birth registration mandatory at the state-level became 
effective. In most cases, simply the year is included. A few cases include the month of the year. 
The National Center for Health Statistics publishes an on-line report titled “Where to Write for  
Vital Records”35. For most states this includes a date since when the state office of vital statistics holds 
records of births and other events. These dates are shown in Table A1. In many cases, the month of the 
year is also reported.36 This is not necessarily the date when a state-level birth registration law came into 
force. In some cases, some records are available from a period before registration at the state level began 
(generally  county  records,  or  records  from specific  cities).  For  the  majority  of  the  states,  the  year 
mentioned coincides with the year reported in Nichols for when birth registration was required by a state  
law (see Table 1). In a few cases the date is unavailable in “Where to Write for Vital Records”, or the 
report implies that earlier records are available in state archives, but the date is missing. The data are then 
supplemented with information from Eichholz (2004), which contains state-specific entries discussing the 
history of vital records in each state. In most cases, the information on laws in Eichholz corresponds with 
that  in  Nichols  (1980),  although Nichols focuses  more specifically on the state  laws and when they 
became effective.  The years  in  Table  A1 are  used  to  construct  an  alternative  indicator  for  the  birth 
registration law and used in a robustness check in Table 6 (Model 5). 
35 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/w2w.htm   (last accessed 1 February 2012)
36 However, even if this information could be used to construct an alternative indicator for the beginning of birth registration
at the state level, data on the month, or quarter, of birth are not available in the 1910-1930 censuses.  
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Table A1 Date from which birth records are available at the State Vital Statistics Office.
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (2011), but in a few cases the information is missing, or the starting 
date ambiguous in this reference. In such cases, denoted with *, sections of Eichholz (2004) that discuss state vital 
records are used.
Figure A1 Map: Timing of enactment of birth registration law across U.S. states 
Source of map: Wikimedia Commons. GNU Free Documentation Licence.
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State Date State Date
Alabama January 1908 Nebraska Late 1904
Arizona July 1909 Nevada July 1911
Arkansas February 1914 New Hampshire 1640
California July 1905 New Jersey 1848 (1848-1900 in state archives)
Colorado 1910 New Mexico 1920
Connecticut *1897 New York 1881
Delaware *Records in state archive mainly start North Carolina October 1913
from 1913, although some earlier. North Dakota 1870 (incomplete over 1870-1920)
Florida January 1917 (some since 1865) Ohio 20 December 1908
Georgia January 1919 Oklahoma October 1908
Idaho July 1911 (some from 1907) Oregon 1903
Illinois January 1916 Pennsylvania January 1906
Indiana October 1907 Rhode Island * 1853
Iowa July 1880 South Carolina January 1915
Kansas July 1911 South Dakota July 1905
Kentucky January 1911 Tennessee January 1914
Louisiana *Majority from 1914 Texas 1903
Maine 1923 (from 1892 in state archive) Utah 1905
Maryland August 1898 Vermont *1857
Massachusetts *1841 Virginia June 1912 (some from 1853-1896)
Michigan 1906 (some from 1867) Washington July 1907
Minnesota January 1900 West Virginia January 1917
Mississippi November 1912 Wisconsin October 1907 (earlier incomplete)
Missouri January 1910 Wyoming 1909
Montana Late 1907
Nichols presents the years for birth registration laws for each state in a table, but also includes a 
discussion separately for each state. She reports the year from which registration was considered to have 
become effective. Some states had enacted laws earlier than the year reported in the table, but these laws 
were not  considered  effective.  There  are  some cases,  discussed below,  where  instead  of  the  year  in 
Nichols' table, the discussion in Nichols (and Eichholz (2004) in a few cases) is used to determine the 
timing of the birth registration law as opposed to using the date in the table. 37 
In the case of Delaware, Nichols provides three separate years. The first law was enacted in 1861, 
but repealed after two years. The next law was enacted in 1881, but was not considered very effective. 
Finally, 1913 is listed as the year when the Bureau of Vital Statistics was created and a corresponding law 
enacted. The 1881 law is reported by Nichols to have succeeded in registering about 50 percent of the 
population, which is far from complete registration, but enough to be considered a change. Therefore, 
1881 is chosen as the year of the law.
In the state of New York, the state procedures did not cover New York City, or Albany, Buffalo 
and Yonkers prior to 1914, which had their own registration procedures. However, as the census data do 
not include information on the place of birth, other than the state, this aspect cannot be considered. The 
table in Nichols shows 1915 as the year when birth registration was required by law at the state-level. 
However,  the discussion states that  a state-level  registration law was enacted in 1880, but it  did not 
include penalties for non-compliance. However, here it seems appropriate to use 1880, which  Eichholz 
(2004) also mentions as the year of the law. Records of birth are available in the state office since 1881. 
For  South  Dakota,  the  table  in  Nichols  shows  1920 as  the  year  when birth  registration  was 
required by law at the state-level. However, the discussion notes that a state law was also passed in 1905, 
but it did not include penalties for non-compliance. As in the case of New York, 1905 is used as the 
relevant year in this study. This is again the year from which records are available in the state office.
Vermont is described by Nichols as a state where state-wide records of births and deaths were 
reasonably complete already by 1800, but the year of the mandatory state law is unclear. According to 
Eichholz (2004) (and confirmed by information on the website of the Vermont Department of Health), 
registration at the state-level began in 1857, which is the year used in this study. 
Several other  states  require  a  mention.  In  Idaho,  since  1907  midwives  and  physicians  were 
required to report births to county recorders, which explains why some records are available from 1907. 
Since 1911, births had to be reported directly to the state, and this is considered the year of enactment of 
the state law (also the year in Nichols' table).
In Michigan, the first Vital Statistics registration law was enacted in 1867, but the information was 
collected in the form of an annual census and according to Eichholz (2004), the law was not effective.  
The year provided in Nichols' table, which is 1906, is used.
37 It should be noted that the results in this study would not change had the year of the birth registration law always taken to
be the one in Nichols' table. The results are not shown.
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For Minnesota, the table in Nichols shows 1908 as the year when birth registration was required 
by law at the state-level. However, the further discussion on Minnesota suggests that the first law was  
passed already in 1872, but that it was not effective. Therefore, 1908 is chosen as the year of the law. 
Records are available in the state office from 1900. 
According to Nichols, New Hampshire passed the first registration law already in 1714, but it was 
not well enforced. The 1883 law was considered instrumental for achieving more complete registration, 
and it is therefore chosen as the year, as recorded in Nichols' table.
In the case of North Dakota, the discussion in Nichols (and Eichholz, 2004) suggests that a state 
registration law was passed in 1893, but it is unclear whether any certificates as such were issued. The 
date coded in the Nichols' table is 1907, when North Dakota passed the Model Vital Statistics Act, which 
requires individual birth certificates to be issued. This is the year used in this study.
Nichols reports that in New Jersey, registration of births began in 1878, but that a state law was 
passed earlier,  and records of births are reported to be available from 1848. For the purposes of the 
regression analysis in Section 5 and 6, it is irrelevant which year is chosen, as all children in the sample 
would have been born with a birth registration law in any case. The year in Nichols' table (1878) is used.
In the case of Nebraska, it is somewhat unclear whether any type of birth certificates were issued 
prior to 1912. The discussion implies that such birth records may not have included the child's name, but 
sex and parent's name(s). The state office is reported to have records from late 1904. This study uses 1904 
as the year, which is the year in Nichols' table.
A state law on the registration of vital events in Oklahoma was passed in 1917, and therefore this 
year is used. However, according to Eichholz (2004), recording of vital events began in 1908, which 
explains why state records are available from 1908 (Table A1).  
Virginia had a birth registration law between 1853-1896, but according to Nichols, reporting was 
incomplete and many of the records were destroyed during the Civil War. The law ended in 1896, and a 
new one was not enacted prior to 1912, which is considered as the year of the law for this study.
State registration of births started in West Virginia in 1917, but was not compulsory by law prior 
to 1925, which is the year recorded in Nichol's table and used in this study.
Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio and Wisconsin are among the few states for which Nichols' table 
includes a month for the law. In these four states, the law became active from late in the year (October-
December). In these cases, it is assumed that the law became effective in the following year. 
Child labor and compulsory schooling laws
These  data  are  from Goldin  and  Katz  (2008)  and  can  be  accessed  through  Goldin's  website 
(http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/goldin/data, version of data from July 2011). The values for 
each  state  represent  those  that  applied  to  the  majority  of  the  population,  as  sometimes  there  were 
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exemptions  or  differences  between  areas  in  a  state.  These  data  are  available  for  1910-1939 for  the 
majority of the legal indicators, but start from 1900 for variables on the legal school entry and leaving  
age. The data set excludes Alaska, Hawaii and District of Columbia. For the regression analysis with the 
1910-1930 census data, the child labor and schooling laws refer to those in place in the child's state of 
residence. Section 6 includes an analysis of educational attainment with the 1960 census data. In this case, 
these laws refer to those in place in the individual's state of birth.
The main child labor law indicator in this study is based on the “Age at which youth can obtain a 
work permit for work during normal school hours”. The 'child labor law' variable in the regression models 
is  a  dummy variable  that takes a value of 1 when the child is  below minimum working age,  and 0 
otherwise. When the minimum working age is coded as zero,  it  is assumed that there is no required 
minimum working age. The 'school law” variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the 
child falls within the compulsory schooling age range; that is when the child has reached the minimum 
entry age and is below the leaving age. This relies on the following indicators: 
1) Minimum required school entrance age,
2) Maximum compulsory schooling age (minimum school leaving age) . 
If the required school leaving age and school entry age are coded as zeros, it is assumed that there is no 
compulsory schooling age. In the data set, if one takes a value of zero, so does the other.
The data also include indicators on length of schooling requirements. An alternative version of the 
minimum working age indicator would take into account the minimum years of education required for a 
work permit (similar to Goldin and Katz (2008) and Manacorda (2006)). In the analysis for 1910-1930 in 
Section 5, a robustness check (Table 6, Model 5) is conducted with a child labor law dummy variable that  
is based on the following alternative indicator for the minimum working age:
Max{minimum age for work permit; minimum school entrance age + years of education required 
for obtaining a work permit} 
The value for the school entrance age is the prevailing legal age in the child's current state of residence 
when the child was 7 years old. If there was no minimum schooling requirement for a work permit, the 
minimum age for a work permit is used (if such existed). A “read and write” requirement is considered as 
equivalent of to four years of schooling, as in Goldin and Katz (2008). 
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Appendix 2 Timing of the birth registration laws
A state-level OLS model is estimated to analyze whether the timing of the birth registration law 
correlates with the levels, and trends, of core economic and social indicators. The analysis relies on a 
state-level data set constructed using 1 percent samples from the U.S. Population censuses for 1870 and 
1900. Core variables that depict the socioeconomic status are chosen as explanatory variables: share of 
black  population,  share  of  adult  workforce  in  manufacturing,  share  of  literate  adults,  degree  of 
urbanization, share of immigrants, average age and the average occupation score of the household head.38 
The last one proxies for income, given that data on incomes are not yet available in these census samples. 
Summary statistics for the variables can be found in Table A2, which also includes variable definitions.
 
Table A2 Summary statistics for states
“Share of literate adults” and “share born outside USA” include everyone above 15 years. “Adults workers” are  
those between 15 and 60 years of age.  Occupational score is available for individuals who have an occupation and 
takes a value up to 80. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample includes 47 states and excludes Alaska,  
Hawaii, District of Columbia, and Oklahoma (the last one did not have data for 1870) and the others are excluded  
in the regression analysis. 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table A3. Firstly, a model is estimated using 
the 1870 census, with the year when the birth registration law came into force as the dependent variable. 
For nearly all of the states, 1870 corresponds to a “pre-registration law” year. This is followed by a model 
that includes changes in the core variables between 1870 and 1900 as explanatory variables. The degree 
of correlation between the levels of the explanatory variables is relatively high, whereas the correlation 
between the trends in the variables between 1870-1900 is not.
Most explanatory variables are mostly statistically insignificant. The only statistically significant 
coefficient in the analysis with 1870 levels is the one on the share of urban population. The standard 
deviation for the share of urban population variable is 0.16. For one standard deviation higher share of  
urbanization, the birth registration law would have been enacted around 6.9 years earlier. Although this 
might appear large at first instance, it must be remembered that the enactment of the law was spread over 
38  The last one is a variable that assigns the person's occupation a value that represents the median total income of all 
individuals with that occupation in 1950 (in hundreds of 1950 dollars). 
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1870 levels 1870-1900
Mean Mean change
Share urban 0.18 (0.16) 0.14 (0.11)
Share of adult workforce 0.11 (0.10) 0.03 (0.04) 
Share black 0.12 (0.18) -0.006 (0.02)
Share of literate adults 0.77 (0.20) 0.10 (0.12)
Share born outside USA 0.25 (0.20) -0.05 (0.11)
Mean occupational 17.91 (2.84) 1.71 (1.25)
score for adult workers
Mean age 23.77 (2.87) 2.02 (2.14)
in manufacturing
more than 80 years. The changes in the chosen variables between 1870-1900 are not associated with the 
timing  of  the  law,  with  the  exception  of  the  share  of  literate  adults,  which  is  weakly  statistically 
significant and positively associated with the timing. States with faster growth in literacy rates, enacted 
the laws later. The results in Table A3 imply that the changes in core socioeconomic circumstances in the 
pre-registration period largely did not coincide with the enactment of the registration laws.
Table A3 Timing of birth registration laws 
Dependent variable: Year when birth registration required by law, OLS.
       **,*,+ significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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(1) (2)
Variables 1870 Levels
Share urban -43.31 3.80
[16.97]* [23.06]
Share of adult workforce -15.18 -54.41
[36.44] [67.37]
Share black 8.99 -10.55
[14.84] [75.72]
Share of literate adults -20.71 47.33
[14.23] [23.94]+
Share born outside USA 5.68 -29.62
[11.26] [32.02]
Mean occupational 2.11
score for adult workers [1.63] [1.79]
Mean age -2.04 .35
[1.25]
Constant 1936.46 1897.95
[15.73]** [9.65]**
Obs. 47 47
R² 0.44 0.20
Δ 1870-1900
 
in manufacturing
 
-.43
[.74]
Appendix 3 Additional estimations and discussion
Household fixed effects
The results of linear probability household fixed effects models with child employment as the 
dependent variable are shown in Table A4. The first two columns rely on the pooled sample and the 
remaining three columns show the results of census-specific models. The sample is somewhat smaller 
than the one in  Tables 5 and 6 (by 3-5% depending on census),  since it  excludes  households  where 
individuals belong to more than one family, and individuals who are not related to the head of household.  
Therefore, the fixed effect can be considered family-specific. The models also exclude the two dummy 
variables for race, as there is very little variation within household in these indicators.
Starting with the pooled sample, the results correspond with those of the core models in Table 6,  
although the estimated coefficients are somewhat smaller in size. The birth registration law doubled the 
effectiveness of the minimum working age law in reducing the employment of the under-aged in relation 
to the work-eligible. It did not have an independent effect on the employment of work-eligible children. 
However, the census-specific fixed effects models confirm this result strongly only for 1910. Although 
the  results  for  1920  resemble  those  for  the  Logit  model  for  1920  (Table  5),  the  magnitude  of  the 
coefficients indicates that the registration law directly raised the employment of the work-eligible, but had 
a relatively small effect on the employment of the under-aged  [.043-.057=-.014] The results for 1930 
contradict with those obtained with the logit model for 1930 (Table 5). However, the fixed effects models  
have to be interpreted with caution due to the limited sources of within-family variation in the registration 
law status. The results of the pooled fixed effects models support those of the pooled logit models.
Table A4 Likelihood that child reports an occupation, household fixed effects, linear probability
Notes: **,* significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. The sample includes US-born individuals aged 12-
15, but excludes children who reside in households with more than one family, or individuals who are unrelated to 
the household head. Model (1) with the pooled sample includes dummy variables for year of birth and gender.  
Model  (2)  includes  additionally  dummies  for  the  state  of  birth.  The  census-specific  models  include  dummy 
variables for gender and age. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
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Pooled sample 1910 1920 1930
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Registration law .010 .011 -.057 .043 -.010
[.006] [.006] [.031] [.010]** [.008]
Child labor law -.025 -.025 -.026 -.020 -.052
[.005]** [.005]** [.008]** [.007]** [.009]**
-.034 -.034 -.073 -.057 .022
   Registration law [.005]** [.005]** [.011]** [.008]** [.009]*
Obs. 229623 229623 65928 75094 88601
R² (within) 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.08
Child labor law  × 
Misreporting of age 
Given that the age in the census is self-reported, there is a possibility of misreporting.39 The census 
staff were not instructed to ask for proof of age and thus those who felt that it was in their interest to 
misreport age, might have done so. In particular, children just below the minimum working age with an 
occupation may have been reported to be of an age that makes them legally eligible to work. This concern 
is likely to be valid for any study on age limits that relies on self-reported data on age. Of particular 
interest here is that there may be a connection between the lack of a birth certificate and the tendency to  
overstate age. This could happen because the lack of a birth certificate raises the tendency of under-aged 
children to work. Secondly, although children did not have to present proof of age, those with an official 
record of birth may have been less tempted to misreport age, as in principle their age could be verified. 
If misreporting was connected to birth registration, we would expect the number of work-eligible 
children to be overstated and the number of under-aged children to be understated for children born 
without a birth registration law in relation to those born with a registration law. This would imply a larger 
difference in the employment rates of the under-aged and the work-eligible for those born without a birth 
registration law. If the employment rate of under-aged children was below that of the work-eligible, such 
misreporting would lead to a negative bias on the coefficient  α2  (equation 1) and a positive bias on the 
coefficient α3 (equation 1). If birth registration raised the effectiveness of the minimum working age law 
in reducing under-aged employment, this effect would be underestimated with misreporting of age. 
For an indication of this possibility, Table A5 below shows the age distribution for 12-16 year old 
U.S. born children, for two types of birth states: those where everyone in this age range is born with a  
birth registration law and those where no one in this age range is born with birth registration law. The 
sample is restricted to individuals in states with a minimum working age of 14. 
Table A5 Age distribution for individuals in birth states with a minimum working age of 14 
Notes: 'Registered' = States of birth where everyone is born with a birth registration law, 'Unregistered' = States of 
birth where everyone is born before the registration law. The reported z-statistics relate to a test for the difference 
between the proportions of children of a specific age in the “registered” versus “unregistered” category.  **, *  
significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively.
39 See for example Oppenheim Mason and Cope (1986) for a discussion on the sources of misreporting of age and date of
birth in the 1900 U.S. census.  
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1910 1920 1930
Registered Unregistered Registered Unregistered Registered Unregistered
Age
12 0.2093 0.2050 1.13 0.2239 0.2178 1.66 0.2083 0.2170 -1.81
13 0.1964 0.1929 0.94 0.2085 0.1994 2.55* 0.1979 0.1937 0.89
14 0.1982 0.2041 -1.56 0.1950 0.2063 -3.17** 0.2033 0.2005 0.59
15 0.1962 0.1918 1.19 0.1880 0.1838 1.25 0.1918 0.1935 -0.37
16 0.1999 0.2063 -1.69 0.1845 0.1927 -2.30* 0.1988 0.1953 0.74
15125 45042 18540 40489 65931 8024
 diff.  diff.  diff.
z-stat. z-stat. z-stat.
Obs.
Assuming that on average age distributions are similar across the two types of states, we would 
expect the proportions of individuals in each age group to be similar across the two groups of states. Table 
A5 reports the results of a test for the differences in proportions of children in each age group. Given that  
the figures relate to states with a minimum working age of 14, the focus of interest should be on the 
differences in the shares of 13 and 14 year olds for children born with and without the registration law. 
There are no statistically significant differences in the 1910 and 1930 censuses. However, in the 1920 
census,  the  share  of  14  year  olds  is  statistically  significantly  higher  and  the  share  of  13  year  olds 
statistically significantly lower for children born without rather than with a birth registration law. This 
indicates that misreporting might have taken place in 1920. If misreporting was connected to under-aged 
employment, in the case of 1920, the difference between the employment of under-aged children born 
with and without a birth registration law could be underestimated. This would imply that in reality the 
enforcement effect of the birth registration law would be even stronger than the current estimates suggest.
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